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 3
1 Introduction  
 
In the past decade the view of the EU as an important international actor has gained 
increasing acceptance. There is no doubt that the EU is an influential actor in the 
economical sphere as it is the largest trading power as well as the major donor of 
humanitarian assistance and developmental aid (Sjursen, 2006; Bretherton and Vogler, 
1999). However it is interesting to investigate the EU’s impact on political and 
diplomatic matters in international relations, as it is heavily debated whether the EU is 
capable of being a significant political actor. Some scholars view that the Union can 
fully exercise its power on the international scene, if its economic power is exercised 
with a stronger sense of collective purpose, i.e. common foreign policy (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 1999).  
 
The first attempt towards common foreign policy was made in the 1970’s with the 
establishment of European Political Cooperation (EPC). The aim of the EPC was to 
provide mechanisms for EC’s member state foreign policy cooperation and coordination 
in order to give a political direction to Community’s external relations. However, the 
lack of agreement between the member states has been an obstacle for providing 
formulation of a more coherent foreign policy. Absence of agreements between the 
member states can be explained by the fact that the political direction to the 
Community’s external relations was without a legal base, lack of compliance 
mechanisms and without a permanent budget. This led to inability of the EPC to act in 
crisis situations that were triggered by the end of the Cold War. It showed that there was 
a strong need for more robust foreign policy system, and the introduction of the 
Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1991 was the first step to accomplishment of that. With the 
TEU the EPC was replaced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and it 
was for the first time that the objectives of common foreign policy were specified. 
These included conflict resolution as well as strengthening international security, 
promoting regional cooperation, combating international crime, and promoting 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights (TEU Art. J.1). However, the CFSP failed 
to progress towards a more positive and coordinate approach of external policy, and the 
ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) meant to increase the effectiveness of 
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policy formulation. The Treaty of Nice (2000) and the not ratified Draft Reform Treaty 
added the defence and military dimension to the CFSP, while the general principles and 
motivation of CFSP stayed mostly unchanged. The illustration of the development of 
the CFSP is presented in order to understand and detect the EU’s nature as being 
normative through implication of the general principles as democracy, liberty, rule of 
law etc. in the Union’s legal base. 
 
The situation in the world after the September 11, 2001 changed the perception of the 
EU on the importance of conflict resolution, conflict prevention, as well as its ability to 
speak in a single voice in the external relations. In the year 2003 the Commission 
launched the European Neighbourhood Policy alongside with the European Council 
initiation of the European Security Strategy. Particularly in the European Security 
Strategy, weak states and frozen conflicts are considered to threaten the security and 
stability in the EU as well the rest of the world. Furthermore, the European Security 
Strategy identified the neighbourhood as a key geographical priority of the EU’s 
external action. It is clear that the European Neighbourhood Policy has the aim of 
promoting the EU’s values as instrument of spreading stability, security and prosperity 
in the southern and eastern neighbourhood (Tocci, 2007).  
 
The legal base of the EU and its foreign policy instruments, like the European Security 
Strategy (ESS) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), raise discussions 
whether or not the EU is a normative power and if it is; how the use of normative power 
impacts the conflict resolution. Ian Manners (2002) is describing the EU as a normative 
power in a sense that it promotes values and norms in order to solve conflicts and its 
apparent interest is to do so through promoting peace, democracy, human rights and rule 
of law in its near abroad. It can especially be seen in the ENP’s rhetoric as the 
promotion of normative values towards a specific country. His claim that the EU should 
be viewed as a normative power is challenged due to militarization of its external 
relations with the establishment of the Nice Treaty and non ratified Reform Treaty. The 
increasing use of military instruments in conflict management can, nevertheless, be used 
in further research when discussing the path of the EU’s nature evolvement.   
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According to Sjursen (2006: 235), conceptualisation of the EU as being “normative” 
power in the international system has brought the research agenda on European foreign 
policy from sterile discussion on whether or not the EU has a foreign policy towards 
debate on what kind of policy it is and its effectiveness. The assumed normative or 
humanitarian dimension to the EU’s foreign policy can be studied from the normative 
theory and from sociological insights into political science. 
From the Normative Power approach we can argue that the EU can be viewed as a 
normative power within the international system as the EU’s international role is 
connected to the “nature” of the polity itself. Additionally, the EU’s capability of 
exercising its normative power is based on its ability to extend its own model in order to 
guarantee stability and security through economic and political means (Sjursen, 2006). 
The ability of spreading its norms to the third party can be studied by applying the 
Europeanization concept with its two main mechanisms - conditionality and social 
learning. It is also important to stress the importance and influence of norms and values 
not only on the EU’s political processes, but also on political processes in general. Basic 
sociological insights and social constructivism in political science can give the 
understanding and notion that common values and norms as well as social principles are 
the base for a stable social order (Sjursen, 2006).  
 
The focus of this paper is to analyse the normative nature of the EU through the ENP 
and whether the use of normative power can have an impact on conflict resolution. For 
the case study we have chosen to look at secessionist conflicts in Georgia. One of the 
reasons for this choice is based on the ESS launched in 2003 stating that the EU should 
take a more active and stronger interest in the problems of Southern Caucasus.  
 
From the very beginning, Georgia was not included in the ENP; however the EU has 
been engaged in providing development aid to the area before the launch of the ESS and 
the ENP. First in year 2004, after the initiative from the Georgian elites, the ENP 
strategies have included Georgia. With this policy, more stress was put on the conflict 
resolution matters in Georgia, and in 2006 Action plan in the framework of the ENP 
was agreed upon. It is also quite challenging to look at the EU’s impact on Georgian 
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conflicts when different super powers, like USA and Russia, together with other 
international actors have been involved in the conflict resolution. 
 
The research question is thus:  
 
How the EU’s normative power impacts the conflict resolution in the case study of 
Georgia? 
 
Research sub-questions:  
 
- Does the EU exercise its normative power in the ENP and other polices towards 
Georgia? 
- How the EU exercises its normative power through the Europeanization 
instruments? 
- Does the EU’s normative power have an impact in conflict resolution in 
Georgia? 
- Reflecting on conflict resolution in Georgia, can we say that the EU has 
capabilities to solve the conflict?  
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2 Methodology  
 
In this section we are going to present the choices made by us for our research study. It 
will include issues on how problem formulation needs to be answered and which 
methodological instruments will be used for our analysis. The section will include 
empirical data, case study as methodological tool, time limit, data, theoretical design, 
delimitation and operationalization of analysis.  
 
2.1 Case study  
Our study is a case study research. The case study as a method is defined in the 
literature “as the intensive study of a single case where the purpose of the study is - at 
least in part - to shed light on a larger class of cases” (Gerring, 2006: 20). Traditionally, 
the case study has been associated with qualitative methods of analysis. However, 
Gerring argues that case study may employ a great variety of techniques, both 
quantitative and qualitative. This is one of the intriguing qualities of the case study 
research and lends that research its characteristic flexibility (Gerring, 2006: 33). 
  
We are going to conduct our case study by using mainly qualitative methods. However, 
we are going to complement our research with quantitative methods, such as statistical 
data. In this context we going to use statistics related to the EU financial assistance 
towards Georgia. As primary sources for our study we are going to use documents – 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security Strategy (ESS), 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
and Action Plans (AP). Our secondary literature is based on researches done by Ian 
Manners, Tocci and Popescu among other scholars.   
 
The factors that determined us to choose Georgia as our case study are the following.  
First of all, Georgia constitutes a testifying ground for the EU capabilities and its impact 
on conflict resolution. In this context it will be interesting to examine what are the 
factors that determine the EU effectiveness in this field of foreign policy. Secondly, 
Georgia raises challenges for the CFSP. The challenge for the EU now in Georgia is 
how the new developed foreign policy - ENP - will be effective towards the conflict 
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settlement in Georgia. Georgia embodies a challenge for the EU facing EU as a security 
actor. The objectives set out in the ESS entitle the EU on promoting stability and good 
governance in the countries on its borders. Therefore Georgia raises the question on 
how the EU can have an impact on the transformation of a state and its secessionist 
conflicts without offering the incentive of the membership. More than that, “EU has a 
stake in Georgia mainly because the Rose Revolution has challenged the shape of 
Europe itself” (Lynch, 2006: 68). The Georgian revolution raised the question of where 
Europe ends. Closely linked to this issue is that of EU’s interests in fulfilment of the 
expectations raised by the “rose revolution”. It is significant for the EU that good 
governance is established in Georgia and that its territorial conflicts are solved 
peacefully. A democratic and stable neighbour is important for the EU security. It is 
also important to mention that Georgia represents an interesting case also when it comes 
to its involvement in the ENP. Initially, Georgia was not included in the ENP. It was 
included later after Georgian elite’s request. 
  
Thirdly, the EU has a direct interest in the stability of Georgia for the transit of energy 
production from the Caspian Sea. With the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil 
pipeline, Georgia plays an important transit role for Caspian oil to the European 
markets.  
 
Georgia also raises challenges for the EU’s capabilities for conflict resolution and the  
EU’s ability to cooperate with other international/ regional security organizations (UN, 
OSCE, NATO), which are involved in conflict settlement in Georgia. More than that, 
Georgia case raises transatlantic stakes. Both EU and USA are present in the settlement 
of Georgia conflict. Thus, transatlantic cooperation is a key factor for Georgia success. 
Involvement of different international actors in Georgia will give us a better possibility 
for exploring the EU’s ways of exporting its norms and values outside borders and how 
these norms can have an impact on conflict settlement in Georgia. Thus, Georgia case 
offers a good testifying field for examination of the EU’s normative approach and what 
makes the EU different from other international actors. Furthermore, Georgia raises 
challenges for the EU-Russian relation. The EU and Russia’s interests in this region are 
not the same. Russia is supporting the secessionist states, while the EU supports the 
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integrity of Georgia. The Russia factor restrains the way the EU engages with 
secessionist conflicts. The challenge for the EU is to strike a positive balance between 
Russia-EU relations on one side and the EU-Georgia relation on the other. Finally, the 
Georgian case and the EU involvement in it will assist us in testifying the normativity of 
the EU. Georgia represents an important test case for the EU in this regard.  
 
2.2 Concepts  
 
For methodological considerations, it is important to distinguish between two 
dimensions related to the EU: that of a player on its own right and the EU as 
framework. The first dimension – EU as an actor - refers to the EU’s role as a player, 
mediating between parties in conflict or supporting the mediation efforts. The second 
dimension – EU as a framework - offers an alternative institutional solution for the 
conflict, such as federal state arrangements, based on the EU’s own model of multilevel 
governance. For the purpose of this research, we will emphasize primarily on the first 
dimension that of the EU as a player, where we will put particular stress on 
Europeanization through conditionality and social learning. 
 
For our research purpose it is also essential to distinguish the concept of secession. 
According to Coppieters et al. “the concept of secession refers to the withdrawal of an 
area from the authority of a state through the creation of a new sovereign state” 
(Coppieters and Huysseune quoted in Coppieters et al., 2004: 2). The actions that lead 
to separation from the authority of a central government may end as secessionist 
conflicts, without necessarily leading to secession. The international community does 
not recognize secessionist entities.     
 
When applying the notion of conflict resolution it is important to distinguish it from the 
notions of conflict prevention and conflict management. The definitions of the three 
concepts are as follows. Conflict prevention aims at preventing violence from even 
breaking out. Conflict management is directed towards preventing escalation once a 
conflict has begun and is a short-term operation. Conflict resolution is concerned with 
re-establishment of peace after the failure of prevention and management strategies. In 
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our study we are going to emphasize only on the concept of conflict resolution. 
Throughout our research the notions of conflict resolution and conflict settlement are 
used interchangeably as synonyms. So, “the conflict resolution suggests the ending of 
the negative or mutually destructive aspects of the conflict itself” (Hariss and Reily 
quoted in Coppieters et al, 2004: 10). Conflict between parties can continue, but they do 
so within the boundaries of a democratic debate and dialogues.  
 
A conflict is defined as being frozen when no-peace-no war status quo is established. 
However, “frozen conflicts do not entail frozen dynamics on the ground” (Tocci, 2006: 
8). 
 
Another explanatory concept used in our project is that of capability gap approach. 
Emphasis will be put on the EU’s foreign policy capabilities towards conflict resolution 
in general and the EU’s capabilities towards Georgia in particular. When examining the 
EU’s capabilities, we will look at economic, political and military capabilities. 
Capabilities approach is going to give us explanatory tools for analyzing EU’s 
effectiveness towards conflict resolution in Georgia. More than that, it will give us the 
possibility to understand whether the EU has capabilities to exports its norms outside its 
borders. For the purpose of this research the EU’s normative nature is explained and 
strengthened/ weakened by the EU’s capabilities. 
 
2.3 Time limit  
Empirically, our study investigates the EU’s conflict resolution instruments developed 
towards Georgia from 1996 with implementation of Partnership Cooperation 
Agreements until 2007 when the ENP Action Plan came into application.  
 
Time is an important factor, which needs to be taken into consideration, when applying 
Normative Power approach. When analyzing the impact of the normative power EU on 
conflict resolution, it is important to take a long-term perspective into consideration. 
This is because the effects of norms and values are not visible in short term, they rather 
manifest themselves in long term.  
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The importance of time in the Europeanization approach must be also stressed. It is 
important to mention that change through conditionality policies may occur in the short 
to medium term, while change through social learning occurs in long term.  
 
2.4 Theoretical design  
For our theoretical framework we are going to use the Europeanization approach and 
Ian Manners’ EU Normative Power approach. As a theoretical background for these 
concepts, we are going to use social constructivism. The way we are applying these 
concepts and theories is explained in the section of Applicability of theories.  
 
2.5 Delimitations  
The delimitation made by us in this study refers to the following.   
The first delimitation, which we need to make, refers to a thematic one. When using all 
theoretical approaches and instruments our study is limited to the EU’s capabilities in 
the field of conflict resolution. Geographically this research is restricted to Georgia and 
the secessionist entities. 
  
Furthermore, when conceptualizing EU’s “actorness”, our aim is not to emphasize on 
the EU’s internal decision making processes in the foreign policy area; our research is 
rather centered on the applicability of normative power EU in the field of conflict 
resolution. We do not assume that EU is normative by nature, but we argue that its 
normative power depends a lot on the interaction between its policy goals and means 
and thus varies between different fields. Therefore, the empirical grounding is essential 
in arguing the normative power EU. For the purpose of this study we are not going to 
look on the member states’ interests and at the processes by which EU foreign policy is 
formulated.  
 
We will assume that the EU is acting as a single actor. This means that no concern is 
made in regard to the individual states’ preferences. However, the fact that individual 
states maintain their distinct national foreign policy is going to be taken into the 
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consideration when analyzing EU’s political capabilities in order to act with a single 
voice.  
 
When applying the Europeanization approach, the limitation that is made refers to the 
fact that we are not looking at the process of Europeanization inside the EU, but rather 
we will extend the applicability of it to the context of the EU’s neighborhood and will 
limit its applicability to the conflict resolution field.  
 
Finally, when we use the term European institutions in this research we mean only the 
institutions of the EU. Thus the term European institutions are not referring to other 
European organizations such as OSCE, Council of Europe and NATO. 
 
2.6 Research framework 
We are going to conduct our analysis in three analytical steps. Firstly, we are going to 
examine and testify EU’s normative power in the ENP and the policies launched 
towards Georgia. Secondly, it is important to identify how the process of 
Europeanization, through mechanisms of conditionality and social learning, can have an 
impact on conflict resolution in Georgia. Thirdly, we are going to examine if the EU’s 
normative power is effective towards the conflict resolution in Georgia and how this 
reflects the EU’s capabilities towards conflict resolution. 
 
2.7 Structure of the project 
Our study will have the following structure: 
In Chapter III we are going to present the theories and concepts which will be applied to 
our empirical case. Our theoretical framework includes the theory of Social 
Constructivism and concepts of Normative Power, Europeanization. The Social 
Constructivism is used as a background for these two theoretical approaches. In Chapter 
IV we are presenting our empirical case. First a presentation of the historical 
background of Georgia will be introduced, which will be followed by a brief description 
on the international actors present in the conflict resolution in the country. We will 
further shortly illustrate the development of Common Foreign and Security Policy, 
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European Security Strategy and European Neighborhood Policy. The EU’s actions 
towards the conflict resolution in the country will be presented. Our analysis is 
conducted in Chapter V. This Chapter includes an analysis on the normativity of the EU 
in Georgia, its actions through Europeanization mechanisms, such as conditionality and 
social learning and finally the impacts of the EU policies will be discussed. Further, in 
the Chapter VI, we will present our discussion and the Chapter VII will include our 
conclusion. 
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3 Theoretical framework  
 
This chapter will present the theoretical framework of the project. We are using 
theoretical approaches of Normative Power EU and Europeanization. As these 
approaches have their scientific basis in the theory of social constructivism, we will 
start the chapter with a brief presentation of social constructivism.  
 
3.1 Social constructivism  
 
Social constructivism (in shorthand: constructivism) in political science is largely 
derived from sociological theory. The core argument of constructivism is based on 
sociological insights that the social reality does not fall from heaven but is constructed 
by human agents and afterwards reproduced through their daily practice (Risse, 2004). 
Moreover, the constructed reality is based on common norms, values and social 
standards. As the social world is made by human agents, the norms and values are 
thereby understandable to them. This argument does not provide a clear sufficient 
definition, thus, it can be described as being based on a social ontology, where “human 
agents do not exist independently from their social environment and its collectively 
shared systems of meanings…” (Risse, 2004: 160). We can also say that norms and 
preferences are developed in a social and cultural context and they are rooted in 
practice, through socialization and internationalization processes.  
 
Social constructivism in international politics focuses on debate of the structure-agency 
relationship. The discussion is taking its basis from Anthony Giddens’ concept of 
structuration. He states that structures – the rules and conditions that guide social action 
- do not determine what actors do in any mechanical way. Giddens also stresses that 
actors are restrained by structures, however, actors can change structures, if they think 
about and act on them in a new manner (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007). One can also say 
that the structures are providing opportunities as well as constraints, however, actors 
having agencies gives possibility to be both rule makers and rule takers.  
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International politics is being perceived as constructed, because identities and interests 
are constructed and supported by inter-subjective practice. According to Wendt: 
“Intersubjective systemic structures consist of shared understandings, expectations and 
social knowledge embedded in international institutions…Intersubjective structures give 
meaning to material ones, and it is in terms of meanings that actors act” (quoted in 
Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 28).  
 
Structures provide distinct patterns of opportunities or constraints within which agency 
is displayed. Actors are, however, aware about the settings they are located within and 
thereby, are able to change them (Hay in Bretherton and Vogler, 1999: 29). In addition, 
constructivism hypothesizes that structures develop through the negotiation and 
interpretation of international rules and practices.  
 
However, in constructivism greatly focuses on the mutual constitutiveness of agency 
and structures and this can be explained by the way in which constructivists 
conceptualise how institutions, as social structures, impact on agents and their 
behaviour. According to Hyde-Price, the “institutions play a key role in the process of 
integrations and identity formation” (2004: 104). They suggest a normative framework 
that forms actors and provides a set of norms in which status of actors acquires meaning 
and value. This also explains why the international institutions and multilateral 
structures ease the emergence of sense of the Community, based on shared interests, 
trust and common identity (Hyde-Price, 2004). 
3.2 Normative power (NP) 
 
The Normative Power approach refers to a power, which is not entirely military, nor 
economic. “Normative power … is a power that is able to ‘shape conceptions of the 
‘normal’’” (Manners in Diez and Manners, 2007: 175). This means that normative 
power works through ideas, concepts and values. The aim of the normative power is to 
set standards through spreading of values. The normative power is primarily exercised 
through norms and values, rather than military or economic means. However, economic 
and military means can be used for justifiable reasons.  
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As mentioned above, the normative power doesn’t reject the use of military or economic 
means. However, the use of military means shall be justified. For instance, military 
means can be used for humanitarian aid, for backing up of spreading the values. The 
only question is - how much use of military power is allowed to stay normative. The 
economic means can also be used for instance, as preconditions for entering the EU. 
Moreover, the normative power is exercised not only in the issues related to human 
rights, but also to a number of other matters as well.  
 
Although the concept of NP was built on the earlier concept of civilian power, and are 
used synonymously by some scholars, these two differ in some parts. It is therefore 
necessary to make distinction between these two concepts for the purpose of this paper. 
It is argued that the civilian power is some type of normative power. The civilian power 
was first developed in the 1970’s by Duchêne in relation to Europe and its stand in the 
Cold War. The main point here was that Europe practices amilitary values and thus it 
has no consensus on its stand in the Cold War, i.e. stand between the poles. The more 
recent developments of the concept define the civilian power in the relation to norms 
and means of practicing the civilian power and its influences. In this sense civilian 
power approach is very close to normative power and therefore it is said to be a 
particular type of normative power. The main characteristic of civilian power is that it 
prefers multilateral, non-military and means of international law (Diez and Manners, 
2007).  
 
The civilian power, it is argued, is exercised in the benefit of the owner, while the 
normative power is concerned with spreading the universal values, as democracy, rule 
of law, human rights among others. The civilian power justifies the means of economic 
sanctions, whereas the normative power doesn’t see this as a solution. The civilian 
power approach, moreover, emphasises the importance of international society in the 
politics, whereas the normative power stresses on the normalization of world politics as 
important in the world politics. Meanwhile, the Normative Power approach is a 
theoretical concept which doesn’t put the normative power as means of achieving 
national goals and interests, that is normative power is not exercised in the sake of 
national interest. 
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The concept of normative power has some deficiencies according to some scholars. As 
Helene Sjursen has noted, the concept of normative power lacks a coherent theoretical 
background. Explaining the issues of validity of norms and the influence of these would 
be more insightful if the analysis is based on the normative and social theories. 
Moreover, she notes that the concept of normative power suffers from the absence of 
criteria on what is normative. Thus Sjursen suggests to analyse the concept by looking 
at empiri and theories. “We need a theory that takes the putative normative dimension 
seriously but that also gives us tools to be critical” (Sjursen, 2006: 236). Another 
critique she gives to the concept of normative power is related to the issue of 
legitimacy. She questions, how one can know whether being normative is a good thing. 
Moreover, a question of who is to define the norms and values can be asked in this 
normative discussion.  
 
The use of military means can be questioned in relation to the normative power. It can 
be argued that the use of military instruments for the sake of humanities can be justified, 
and it makes sense, but where is the limit of using these military means. Where is the 
border between being normative power with use of military means and a military 
power?  
 
Furthermore, Sjursen concludes that the use of non-military means or preferring the 
economic or other means does not necessarily mean that the polity is normative. For 
instance, the use of economic sanctions can also result in harmful consequences among 
the population of a particular country.     
 
3.2.1 Normative power EU (NPEU)  
 
The discussions whether the EU is a normative power or not have been going around for 
some time. The pro-normative power EU literature has been pointing at three main 
characteristics that make the EU as normative power. One of them is that the EU is 
different kind of power in the international relations and as Manners put it “EU exists as 
being different to pre-existing political norms, and that this particular difference pre-
disposes it to act in a normative way” (Manners in Johansson-Nogues, 2007: 183-184). 
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Another characteristic is that this difference is based on a notion that the EU spreads 
values and norms through non-military means. The EU is seen as “traditionally disposed 
of only non-military instruments in international affairs, and is considered to have a 
preference for ‘carrots’ rather than ‘sticks’ in dealing with third countries” (Sjursen, 
2006: 172). The third point is that the polity of the EU seems to play an important role 
in being normative, since the EU is seen as “a ‘post-Westphalian’ entity in which there 
is no single authority, where territorial sovereignty is no longer crucial, and where 
borders are ‘fuzzy’” (Sjursen, 2006: 172). On the other hand, this uniqueness of the EU 
polity is related to the decision-making process in the EU.   
  
According to Ian Manners, the founder of the term “normative power Europe” (NPE), 
the EU is not a civilian, nor a military power, but a normative power. He emphasises on 
the historical context where the EC has been shaped and the values and norms that the 
EU body entails. “The concept on normative power is an attempt to suggest that not 
only is the EU constructed on a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it 
to act in a normative way in world politics” (Manners in Linklater, 2005: 375). One 
might suggest that the establishment of the EC was based more on the economic 
grounds than on the normative ones. Nevertheless, it’s the fact that not only the 
economic instability after the Second World War, but also the macabre of this war and 
the fear for another war were the main reason for establishment of the European Coal 
and Steel Community, which later became EC. Prevention of the consequent world wars 
and security were the core reasons behind the construction of this community. This is 
reflected in the Treaty of Rome, where it is stated that the Community is established on 
the basis of the pooling of the resources of the member states in order to “preserve and 
strengthen peace and liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who share 
their ideal to join in their efforts” (Treaty of Rome, 1957, Preamble). The core 
principles like liberty and democracy are carried out in later established treaties and 
having a spill-over to other EU policies, in our case in the CFSP. Moreover, the 
Preamble of the Treaty of Rome states the aims of the Community as establishing 
prosperity and solidarity in Europe with the stress on the economic and social progress 
(Treaty of Rome, Preamble, 1957). Furthermore, the Copenhagen declaration on 
European Identity stresses the importance of the democracy, rule of law, social justice 
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and human rights in the construction of the European identity (Document on The 
European Identity published by the Nine Foreign Ministers on 14 December 1973, in 
Copenhagen). These principles we can also detect in the provisions of CFSP. Already in 
the Maastricht Treaty the external relations of the EU were based on the core principles 
of the Union, i.e. “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (TEU, Art. J. I. 2). The inclusion of the 
normative engagement in external relations commits the EU to act in a normative way 
in world politics. Moreover, these principles were developed further in articles 6, 11, 
177 of the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) and the commitment of the Union to act according 
to the UN Charter and its principles is shown in the TEU and Treaty of Rome. The EU’s 
commitment to multilateralism serves as one of the main arguments for the legitimacy 
of its normativity. Moreover, these norms are the norms common to all the member 
states (Manners, 2002). Unlike USA, where the actions can be taken on the unilateral 
basis, the EU is acting in accordance with the international law, which indicates the 
legitimacy of the EU actions in the world. 
 
According to Manners, there are six ways of spreading the values and norms, which are 
contagion, informational diffusion, procedural, transference, overt diffusion and cultural 
filter. By contagion it means that the EU unintentionally acts as a source of attraction 
and a role model for other actors, while informational diffusion is a result of strategic 
considerations, declarations and demarche. Procedural way concerns the 
institutionalised relationships between the EU and the third party, the transference is 
related to conditionality and imposition of trade norms. Overt diffusion is represented 
by physical presence of the EU in the third states and cultural filter considers diffusion 
of norms and political learning. The crucial point here, according to Manners, is that 
there is no physical force present in diffusion of the norms and values. “This absence of 
physical force and the importance of cultural diffusion led me to argue that ‘the most 
important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it 
says, but what it is’” (Manners, 2006: 184).  
 
Furthermore, Manners sustains that to be normative means to have consistency between 
what is done inside of the EU and outside. In order to be normative it is necessary to 
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fulfil three conditions: to be good internally, to act good, that is to develop a discourse 
or intentions on actions and to do good, i.e. to realize the discourse. Thus having good 
intentions is not enough, it is also necessary to act good according to these intentions 
and have actual results (Manners, 2002).  
 
However, there are some critical viewpoints as to why the EU is acting as normative 
power and what the dangers can be. For instance, Johansson-Nogues notes that the EU 
might be acting normative out of self-interest, to show how good it is and to support the 
argument that the EU is in fact normative power. Moreover, she argues that this self-
interest of the EU is reflected in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), where it is 
in the interest of the EU to have well-doing neighbours (Johansson-Nogues, 2007). 
However, counterargument for this is that the strategic intentions behind spreading the 
values is not enough to question the legitimacy of the normative power, “it would not 
necessarily topple the ‘normative’ power argument, given that the norms diffused may 
very well be considered valid and legitimate even though the motives of the EU for 
diffusing such norms are self-regarding” (Sjursen, 2006: 239).  
 
Johansson-Nogues further sustains that the problem with the normative power Europe 
concept can be the fact that the EU, by acting normative and spreading values and 
norms, can be perceived by some other international actors as neo-imperialist and 
Eurocentric. Although accepting that the norms and values are important for the EU 
foreign policy, she argues further that “the Union has to be careful in its rhetoric in 
order not to offend anyone’s sensibilities” (Johansson-Nogues, 2007: 185). Another 
problem with the notion of normative power Europe, according to her, is the fact that 
too much attention paid to this term might lead to disregard and neglect other important 
aspects of the EU foreign policy. 
 
In the next section we are going to emphasize on Europeanization approach through two 
mechanisms, that of conditionality and social learning as instruments of conflict 
resolution.   
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3.3 Europeanization  
 
Scholars of Europeanization have offered different definitions of the concept.1 In this 
context Caporaso, et al. defined Europeanization as a process that “involves the 
development of formal and informal rules, procedures, norms and practices governing 
politics at the European, national and sub-national level” (quoted in Featherstone and 
Radaeilli, 2003: 13). Another general definition of Europeanization, which can be 
quoted from the literature is that given by Ladraech, who defines Europeanization as “a 
process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EU political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and 
policy making” (quoted in Featherstone and Kazamias, 2000: 13). Thus, 
Europeanization as an analytical concept is used to study the changes in domestic 
structures and policies that take place in response to policies and practices 
institutionalized at the European level. More than that, it stands for a process in which 
European rules, mechanisms and collective understanding interact with given domestic 
structures. However, none of these definitions created a link between Europeanization 
and conflict resolution in the context of secessionist conflicts.  
 
Before moving to the definition of Europeanization taken by us for our research area, it 
is important to make a distinction between Europeanization approach in the EU context 
and Europeanization concept in the context of EU’s periphery. In the EU context, 
Europeanization is described as an interactive process, where the member states affected 
by the integration process are at the same time the players, who initiate and shape this 
process (Coppieterrs et al 2004: 7). Thus, this is characterized as a two–way relationship 
between structure and agency, where agency is transformed due to participation in EU 
structures. In the case of the states at the EU’s periphery, the dynamics of 
Europeanization process is different. The states affected by this process do not have the 
institutional means to co-determine decisions of the EU that affect them.  
 
Based on these conceptual explanations, our working definition for this particular 
research question concerning the EU and the conflict resolution, is the one adopted by 
                                                 
1 See Kevin Featherstone and Claudio M. Radaelli, The politics of Europeanization, Oxford University 
press, 2003, Johan P Olsen , The many faces of Europeanization” Arena working paper 2002 
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Coppieters et al., who defined Europeanization for particular context of conflict 
resolution as “a mechanism and a process at the same time which is activated and 
encouraged by European institutions by linking the final outcome of the conflict with 
the degree of integration or association of conflict parties with European structures. This 
link is made operational by means of specific conditionality and socialization 
mechanisms, which are built into the process of Europeanization” (Coppieters et al., 
2004: 7). As we mentioned earlier that by European institutions we mean only EU 
institutions and we do not include other European organizations such as OSCE, Council 
of Europe and NATO under this term. More than that, for the purpose of this study we 
will restrict the extent of applicability of the Europeanization concept in two ways. The 
first limitation is geographical, and refers to the periphery of the EU. The second 
limitation is a thematic one and refers to the secessionist conflicts in countries, which 
are not members of the EU and have not been granted applicant status but who were 
developing closer relations with the EU through other instruments.  
 
The impact of the EU institutions and policies on the states neighboring the EU is felt 
on three levels: 
 
- Institutional compliance, where EU policies reshape domestic policies;  
- Changing domestic opportunity structures - by changing domestic rules of the game, 
European policies adjust the strategic position of domestic actors and enable them to 
challenge existing domestic arrangements; 
- Framing domestic beliefs and expectations - by changing the beliefs, expectations and 
identity, Europeanization occurs through policy learning and the diffusion of the 
experience. 
 
Europeanization can provide the mechanisms to generate these changes. The two main 
mechanisms of Europeanization, which can be viewed as main instruments constituting 
the EU’s capacity for foreign policy action on its periphery are conditionality and social 
learning.2 The EU has built up its policies of conditionality with the aim of transforming 
the governing structures, the economy and the civil society of the neighboring countries. 
                                                 
2 In this respect see Börzel and Risse in Featherstone and Radaelli , 2003: 58-69 
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Conditionality was defined by Tocci as “a strategy whereby a reward is granted or 
withheld depending on the fulfillment of an attached condition” (2007: 10). In this 
context Smith states that “political conditionality entails the linking, by a state or 
international organization, of perceived benefits to another state, to the fulfillment of 
conditions relating to the protection of human rights and the advancement of democratic 
principles” (Quoted in Tocci, 2007: 10).  
 
There are two different approaches on how the EU conditionality can affect the conflict 
resolution. In the first approach, the polices of conditionality can affect the conflict 
resolution directly, when the delivery of the EU benefits are made directly conditional 
to the peace making. Conditionality can also have an indirect effect on conflicts by 
affecting the policy fields linked to the conflict resolution agenda and by this can affect 
the bargaining positions of the conflicts parties. In this context, the way, in which 
conditionality polices can change the domestic practices, is explained by rational 
institutionalism. Rational institutionalism says that the domestic players are goal 
oriented and purposeful. They engage in strategic relations, by using their resources in 
order to maximize their usefulness on the basis of ordered preferences. They evaluate 
the costs and benefits of different strategies, anticipating others behavior. The EU 
conditionality thus causes simple learning. This indicates that rationally calculating 
players, confronted by institutional constraints, can easily change their strategies and 
tactics in order to achieve their objectives. However this does not mean that they will 
therefore change their fundamental identities (Checkel quoted in Tocci, 2007).  
 
In the second approach, the EU conditionality polices affects domestic change 
principally by altering the domestic opportunity structure. In this case, conditionality 
policies may offer resources and legitimization to some domestic players, while 
constraining the ability of others to follow their goals (Risse et al., 2001). The EU’s 
ability to mobilize domestic actors mainly depends on the will, resources and interests 
of particular groups, as well as on the existence of cohesive pro-European identities 
around which interest can be mobilized. 
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According to Risse et al., the extent to which conditionality can produce domestic 
change also depends on the overlap between the EU conditions and pre-existing 
domestic practices (Risse et al., 2001). Great incompatibility makes conditionality 
unlikely to have an effect. When, instead, some groups within the domestic political 
system are working towards change in the same direction as the one promoted by the 
EU, conditionality could strengthen these groups and influence the resulting policies.  
 
Finally, the impact of the EU conditionality on the domestic opportunity structures 
depends on the value attached to the EU benefits by different groups within the society 
and the extent to which the domestic players are committed to the EU integration 
project or to the alternative benefit to membership – ENP. 
  
Conditionality is not the only mechanism for channeling the EU influence. Just as 
important in examining the possible impact of the EU on its peripheries are the 
socialization processes of domestic political elites and the social learning processes of 
the societies as a whole. In this case, contractual relations are taking place through 
institutional, political, economic and wider societal contact and dialogue with EU actors 
and conflict parties. 
 
While conditionality can be expected to operate mostly in the short run, socialization 
has longer-term effects and can impact on the way in which domestic players define 
their interest and identities (Coppieters et al., 2004). Furthermore, as opposed to 
conditionality, which changes the decision maker’s cost-benefit calculus, in the case of 
social learning domestic changes take place “through a transformation of perceived 
interests, as domestic actors voluntarily internalize the norms and logic underpinning 
the EU system” (Tocci, 2007: 14). Through interaction with the EU institutional 
framework, parties may come to alter their believes, visions and purposes. For example, 
they could change their views on human rights, identity, democracy, sovereignty, etc. 
They can also change their strategies vis-à-vis negotiation, compromise, etc. In the 
context of social learning, learning occurs as Dies argues “when domestic actors are 
faced with new institutional and discursive frameworks which induce the re-articulation 
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of their identities, in a manner indirectly conducive to the resolution of ethno-political 
conflicts in the long term” (Diez, 2002: 6).  
 
In the perspective of the social constructivism, players, through involvement in common 
institutional structures, change their identities and thus their perceived interests and 
subsequent actions. Thus, this can occur as Risse mentions when “change agents” or 
norm entrepreneurs in close contact with international framework mobilize other 
domestic elites and the population, persuade them to change their perception of their 
interest (in Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003: 67). It is also important to point out that if 
the EU norms do not resonate with the third party’s historical, institutional, political and 
socio-economical background, learning is less likely to occur.  
 
Finally, it is important to examine if the mechanism of change, conditionality on one 
hand and social learning on the other, are mutually exclusive or complementary. There 
are important differences between these two mechanisms. Change through 
conditionality may take place in the short to medium term, while change of identities 
and interests may be expected over the long term. Therefore, the importance of time in 
these processes must be carefully taken into consideration. However, in spite of these 
differences there is a link between these two mechanisms. In this perspective, Börzel 
and Risse suggested that the logics of action and interaction strengthening these two 
mechanisms may occur simultaneously in spite of analytical distinction between them. 
Thus, a mechanism can give way to the other (Börzel and Risse, 2000: 74-75). In the 
beginning, conditionality may capture better the mechanism of change, as elites 
confronted with coercion or incentives may modify their positions and accept a 
negotiated settlement. Over time, the institutional, economic, social and political contact 
that these relations entail can lead to deeper changes. This may first be noticeable 
through a change in discourse, which is then assimilated through a change in beliefs and 
perceived interests. However, this does not mean that conditionality automatically gives 
rice to endogenous process of social learning.   
 
When examining what factors can affect the extent and the way in which the EU’s 
conditionality and social learning mechanisms can have an impact on conflict resolution 
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in the European neighborhood, we need to take into consideration the following aspects: 
the value of benefit with reflection on objective /subjective values and timing, and 
another determinant is the credibility and clarity of obligations. 
 
When emphasizing on the value of benefit factor we need to take into consideration the 
EU’s capacity to act beyond its borders. Objectively, the EU conditionality can lead to 
domestic change in its periphery, if the EU benefits are perceived as being valuable by 
the third party. The value of the benefits depends both on the objective elements of the 
EU offer and on the subjective evaluation of those benefits. Thus, when EU 
membership is an option the EU’s potential leverage is higher than in the cases were the 
EU is offering other alternatives to membership. The value of benefit can also affect the 
potential for social learning. The main question here is how learning can take place 
beyond the EU borders, where EU institutional, political, economic dimension is limited 
almost exclusively to the third country elites. Another element, which is equally 
important, is the importance of the subjective value. The more a third country identifies 
with “Europe” the greater is EU’s potential to influence on it. An additional determinant 
of the value is that of timing. The benefits of the EU are usually delivered in the long 
term. Thus long term benefits are valued less than short terms ones and therefore it can 
diminish the incentives for change generated by the EU conditionality. Time lags may 
also encourage domestic actors to delay reforms until the delivery of the benefits is 
nearer. 
 
When emphasizing on the credibility obligations as determinants for the EU’s 
conditionality and social learning, we need to mention that EU’s credibility depends on 
the recipient’s perception on the donor’s capacity and willingness to carry out declared 
commitment (Tocci, 2006). Some of the EU’s obligations are more credible than the 
others. Thus the obligations, which derive from the Copenhagen criteria, are more 
credible than the human rights and democracy demands in the context of partnership 
and cooperation. 
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3.4 Applicability of theories 
 
After presenting our theoretical framework, it is important to explain how we are going 
to apply these theories in our research. In order to conduct our analysis the theories of 
social constructivism, Ian Manners Normative power EU approach and Europeanization 
concept through the mechanism of conditionality and social learning are going to be 
used.  
 
As the main background for our Normative Power approach and Europeanization 
approach we will use social constructivism theory. The Social Constructivism is first of 
all explained from Social Theory as the latter has basic insights of illustrating the 
common norms, values and social convention as the foundation of social order. 
Furthermore, the social order is made by human agents and thereby understandable to 
them. The insights of Social Theory have also a spillover to the political science. The 
Social Constructivism in international relations is used to explain international order as 
being social constructed where the interests and ideas are created and supported by 
inter-subjective practice. Moreover, the social constructivism is used to illustrate the 
interaction between states and to explain why states are able to find and agree upon 
standards of behaviour in international relations. Using social constructivism in our 
research will contribute to a deeper understanding on how the EU can be constituted by 
norms and how these norms are exported outside its borders.  
 
Ian Manners Normative Power approach is going to be applied in order to testify EU’s 
normativity vis-à-vis ENP and supplemented with other polices launched towards 
Georgia. In this context EU’s normative nature is testified by looking at the following 
factors: the way the EU is constituted historically and politically, normative principles 
and coherence among what the EU is doing inside and outside. Historical and political 
factors are going to help us understand how the EU developed its normativity through 
the CFSP. Related to the normative principles these are going to be detected mainly in 
the ENP and other polices towards conflict resolution in Georgia. The coherency factor 
is going to give us possibility in explaining the EU’s intentions and the impact of EU 
policies towards conflict resolution in Georgia.  
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Europeanization approach is applied in order to explain the ways in which the EU can 
affect the conflict resolution in Georgia. In this context the EU’s two instruments are 
going to be applied: conditionality and social learning. The way we apply 
Europeanization approach is restricted in two ways. Europeanization approach is limited 
geographically to a conflict beyond the EU and thematically is restricted to the field of 
conflict resolution. Europeanization approach and its main mechanism are going to help 
us to comprehend the process of how the EU is exporting its norms outside the borders 
and how the EU can have an impact on conflict resolution. The main emphasize is 
going to be put on how the EU is able to change domestic opportunity structures and 
frame domestic believes and additionally lead to conflict settlement in Georgia.     
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4 Empirical framework  
 
 
This chapter will provide the empirical base of the project. In order to give a full 
illustration to the problem area, we will first give a historical overview on the Georgian 
politics and the secessionist conflicts. Moreover, the conflict resolution efforts which 
took place in the country are looked upon. This will be continued by a brief outline on 
the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European 
Security Strategy. The overview on the CSFP and ESS will not be used for the 
analytical purposes, but for background knowledge. This will be further elaborated by 
the introduction to the European Neighbourhood Policy. In the end of the empirical part 
we will introduce the conflict resolution efforts taken from the EU side, where different 
instruments of the EU will be discussed.  
  
4.1 Historical background on Georgian politics 
 
The aim of this section is to give the reader an overview on the historical background of 
Georgia and the secessionist entities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, evolution of the 
conflicts and an understanding on the complexity of the these conflicts. Thus, a political 
history of the country will be briefly provided, which will be followed by the conflict 
resolution efforts from different international actors.   
 
Geographically Georgia is situated in the region of Trans-Caucasus, and is a land of 
linguistic, cultural and ethnic diversity, accommodating varied population consisting of 
Georgians, and minority of Abkhazians, Ossetes and Armenians. Georgia is rich in 
mineral resources and is located in the centre of essential energy routes.    
 
The Southern Caucasus came under the Tsarist Russian control in the beginning of the 
19th century with a short period of independence in 1917-1921. After the establishment 
of the USSR Abkhazia was incorporated into Soviet Republic of Georgia, while South 
Ossetia has become an autonomous region of Georgian Republic in the 1920’s (Tocci, 
2007; Herzig, 1999).  
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The conflicts in Georgia have a long history dating back to the beginning of the 20th 
century and even before and throughout the Soviet Era. The Abkhazians and Ossetes are 
distinct from Georgians linguistically and culturally. Territorial tensions and bloody 
conflicts were occurring in the period between the Russian revolution and the 
establishment of Soviet Union. Incorporation of South Ossetia into Georgian Socialist 
Republic raised more tensions and frustration among the Ossetes, who were dissatisfied 
by being under the Georgian rule and separated from the other Ossetes from the North 
Ossetian Autonomous Republic of Russian Federation.    
 
Abkhazia has an important geographic position with the routes and railways connecting 
Georgia with Russia, the land is not only rich in mineral resources and agriculture, but 
also has the most of the coastline of Georgia. As it was in the case of South Ossetia, 
there were territorial conflicts between Abkhazia and Georgia and incorporation of 
Abkhazia into Georgia has become the source of dissatisfaction among the 
Abkhazians3. Since 1930’s the Abkhazians protested subordination to Georgia and in 
1960’s and 1970’s the requests to return their 1921 status quo were sent to the Kremlin. 
During the rule of J. Stalin and L. Beria (1933-1953) - both of them being Georgian 
nationals - assimilation policy towards the Abkhazians were conducted (Tocci, 2007). 
During this period, the Abkhazians felt that their cultural and linguistic heritage, their 
identity was at a verge of disappearance. The perestroika has given the nationalist 
movements a possibility to claim their rights in 1989-1991, where on the one side the 
Georgian nationalists were declaring the superiority of Tbilisi as authority, while 
Ossetes were emphasising on their autonomy and unity with North Ossetia.  
 
The presidency of a nationalist Z. Gamsakhurdia has further marginalized both 
Abkhazians and South Ossetes. In 1990 a declaration of sovereignty was adopted by the 
Ossetian Soviet and a request for recognition was sent to Moscow. The South Ossetian 
parliament was directly subordinated to Moscow. Meanwhile Tbilisi has excluded the 
regional parties from election, and has changed the status of South Ossetia. These 
events resulted in bloody conflicts in the end of the 1990, which has created a huge 
                                                 
3 Abkhazia has first became a part of Russia in the beginning of 19th century and in 1921 it was given the 
status of Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia for a decade until it was incorporated into the Republic of 
Georgia in 1931 
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immigration of Georgians from South Ossetia, while Ossetes living in other parts of 
Georgia had to immigrate to South and North Ossetia. The ceasefire was achieved in 
1992, where Russians played an important role (Herzig, 1999; Tocci, 2007).    
 
In 1990 Abkhazia has declared its sovereignty and in 1991 a referendum on new Soviet 
Union has collected the majority of votes for joining the Soviet Union as autonomous 
republic. A civil war burst in 1991-1992 where the coup has taken down Gamsakhurdia, 
and E.Shevardnadze was invited to rule the country again. However, Shevardnadze’s 
return didn’t solve the crisis in the country, when the country was divided between the 
pro-Shevardnadze and pro-Gamsakhurdia, the latter organized by Georgians in the west 
Georgia and Abkhazia. The pro-Shevardnadze parliamentarians have blocked the 
power-sharing in the Abkhazian parliament and have amended the Georgian 
constitution, where they didn’t state the autonomy of Abkhazia. Meanwhile the 
Abkhazians voted for restoring the Abkhaz Constitution of 1925, where the ties between 
Georgia and Abkhazia are of confederal nature. In 1992 Georgia has sent troops into the 
territory of Abkhazia, in order to prevent sabotages. However, this has resulted in 
violent and destructive events and this in return has led to militant actions from the side 
of Abkhazia. In 1993 with the support from the Chechen warriors and Russian military 
assistance Abkhazia has won the war over Georgia, where almost all the Georgians 
together with the troops were expelled from the territory of Abkhazia (Herzig, 1999).   
 
Despite the ceasefire agreements, memorandums of understanding and multiple other 
efforts from the side of various international actors, the conflict in Georgia is considered 
to be “frozen”. The changes that followed the peaceful “rose revolution” which ousted 
Shevardnadze were very positive - the efforts to fight organized crime and corruption 
were made. Moreover, in 2004 the new president, M. Saakashvili, came up with peace 
plans where the main issues were considering giving a broader autonomy to both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, giving dual citizenship to the South Ossetes, free 
economic zone, demilitarization and economic rehabilitation among other things. 
However, some of the efforts went too far, as to result more clashes, when a market in 
South Ossetia was closed within the framework of an operation of fighting against 
illegal smuggling and Georgian troops were deployed in the area in order to control the 
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anti-smuggling activities. This step has resulted in a more dependency of South Ossetia 
on Russia and the military actions have provoked South Ossetes which led to new 
clashes in 2004 (Tocci, 2007). As Tocci puts “…Georgian leadership has engaged in 
dangerous brinkmanship over South Ossetia. This has reduced prospects for negotiated 
peace settlements, encouraged the remilitarization of the conflict zones, and exacerbated 
Georgian-Russian tensions” (2007: 130-131). This means that the situation in the 
country is still very fragile and violence can occur at any time.  
 
In the next paragraph, we will give a general overview over the attempts to establish 
peace in the region and the most important international actors who participated in the 
conflict resolution in Georgia which will be followed by a more detailed review on role 
the European Union had played. The account of other international actors, such as 
Russia and USA among others is given in an attempt to fully illustrate the conflict 
resolution efforts in the area as well as of being able in our analysis to highlight the role 
of the EU in this conflict resolution as a normative power in comparison to the other 
above mentioned actors. Moreover, as the reader will see, Russia and USA have played 
essential roles in the development of the events in Georgia, therefore it is impossible to 
ignore these actors in this particular conflict.       
 
4.2 The conflict resolution efforts in Georgia by international actors 
 
Since the ceasefire agreements in 1992 and 1994 in South Ossetia and Abkhazian 
conflicts respectively, there were numerous efforts to establish peace in the region. The 
ceasefire agreement had established a joint peace keeping force (PKF) including 
Georgia, Russia and South Ossetia. Moreover, according to the agreement the OSCE 
had the monitoring role on the territory of South Ossetia. The OSCE has established a 
resident mission in Georgia in 1992 in order to assist the parties in negotiations, but 
since 1994 the role of the OSCE was extended to monitoring of peace keeping in South 
Ossetia (Herzig, 1999; Tocci, 2007). The monitoring of the OSCE took place also on 
the border between Georgia and Russia in the period of 1999-2004. The PKF was 
effective until 2004, where it failed to prevent violent conflicts in the same year. 
Furthermore, by the ceasefire agreement it was decided to establish Joint Control 
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Commission (JCC) with Georgia, Russia, South and North Ossetia on three main issues: 
refugee return, economic rehabilitation and security. In 1996 a memorandum was 
signed between the conflicting parties on the refugees and demilitarization among other 
issues. From 1999 the political status of South Ossetia got on the agenda and in 2000 
“Baden declaration” on South Ossetian autonomy within Georgia, demilitarization and 
security was signed. However, the Baden declaration was largely ignored by the 
president of South Ossetia, E. Kokoity (Tocci, 2007). 
   
In the Abkhazian case, numerous efforts were made in 1994 including the ceasefire 
agreement mediated by Russia which has stationed force of Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) in the territory of Abkhazia, where the entire peace keeping 
force consisted of Russians. The UN, in order to prevent violence in Abkhazia, set up 
the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), while Russia has again 
mediated between the conflicting parties a declaration of measures for political 
settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, which was later abandoned by Georgia. A 
quadripartite agreement on the matters of refugees was made between Georgia, Russia, 
Abkhazia and UN High Commission for Refugees, but this agreement has failed to 
succeed due to insecure environment.  
 
In 1997 a UN Geneva Process between the conflict parties, Russia (as facilitator), 
UNSR was conducted, where it was decided to give the OSCE and the Group of Friends 
of Georgia an observer status and a Coordinating Council was established. This Geneva 
Process was not successful and, according to Tocci, the reason for this, among others, is 
the suspicion from the side of Abkhazians (2007). Following the Process, in the period 
between 1999-2001, numerous negotiations took place between Russia and the Group 
of Friends and as a result the so-called “Boden document” was made, which indicated 
the division of competences between the Georgians and Abkhazians. However, this 
document was largely rejected by the Abkhaz.  
 
In 1997 Russia has mediated between the conflicting sides where an agreement was 
almost concluded between the parties. However, the Georgian side has abandoned its 
commitments later on. In 2003, V. Putin has participated in the agreement between 
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Georgia and Abkhazia in Sochi. Here practical issues, regarding e.g. electricity, railway 
were discussed. However, this agreement has not achieved visible results.   
  
It is obvious that the role of Russia in the Georgian conflict cannot be undermined. 
Numerous military and diplomatic attempts were made by Russia to solve the conflict in 
Georgia; however, there is another side of the medal, which also must be mentioned 
here. Some of the Russian policies towards the region have had negative impacts on 
Georgia, e.g. banning of the export of Georgian wine and mineral water to Russia or 
cutting the energy supplies to Georgia. It is also worth mentioning that Russia can still 
be seen as a military power in Georgia, as Russia has failed to close down its military 
bases in the territory of Georgia. Russian participation in the Georgian issues is very 
complex and as Baev writes “Russia behaves simultaneously as an old colonial power in 
retreat and a young expansionist state, as a guardian of the status quo and as a dynamic 
predator, while its policy style betrays a fusion of superiority and inferiority complexes” 
(2003: 41).  
 
Also USA has been largely involving in the area of Southern Caucasus since the 1990’s, 
especially Georgia was getting the “special treat”. This is due to the strategic position of 
Georgia, being situated at the Black Sea, which is important in the development of the 
region (Shaffer, 2003). Georgia was one of the main beneficiaries of US aid, and in the 
period of 1992-2005 it has received 3 billion US dollars, and from 2005 and 5 years 
onwards it will benefit from 295 million US dollars from USA (Tocci, 2007). 
Moreover, USA has been backing the pipeline of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan before the 
European and western involvement. However, USA’s contribution to the resolution of 
secessionist conflict was not impressive, although it has been releasing statements 
calling for resolution of the conflict (Shaffer, 2003).   
 
Especially after the terrorist attack to USA in September 11, 2001, its involvement in 
Georgia has been deepened and it took an activist position. According to the US 
Security Strategy launched in September 2002, the most security threat comes from the 
countries with possible terrorist networks, regional conflicts, weak states or non-states, 
countries with weapons of mass destruction among other things (White House, 2002). 
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In this sense, Georgia is regarded as a country with possible terrorist network, and 
obviously with regional conflicts and weak state (one proof to this is the peaceful “rose 
revolution”, where the state could not show any resistance). Moreover, “Washington 
views US presence and policy in this region as a component of its larger Middle East 
and anti-terrorism policies” (Shaffer, 2003: 57). USA has been contributing large 
amounts to Georgia by launching operations and programs, such as “Train and equip 
operation”, which had aim of training the Georgian military in order to strengthen them 
in the fight against terrorism. Moreover, USA had contributed 60 million US dollars to 
“Sustainability and stability programme” launched in 2005 (Tocci, 2007). This active 
involvement of USA in Georgian affairs has risen on one hand scepticism in Russia and 
on the other suspicions and fear in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  
          
The United Nations has played a limited role in the area of peacekeeping and conflict 
resolution in the Georgian conflicts. The UN did not involve militarily in the conflicts 
and it did not send the peacekeeping troops after the ceasefire agreement. Moreover, the 
UN did not participate in the reconstruction after the war. Nevertheless, it has been 
active in leading the negotiations between the conflicting parties in Abkhaz-Georgian 
conflict and has been monitoring the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. The 
UN has also engaged in the humanitarian relief in the region.  
 
The role of the OSCE in the region was mainly one of monitoring. It has been involved 
in the activities of monitoring the Joint Peacekeeping Forces. Moreover, it has been 
encouraging a dialogue between the conflicting parties, participating in the negotiations, 
trying to establish cooperation between the parties at the grass-root level. Besides 
assisting the UN in settlement of Georgia-Abkhazia conflict, the OSCE has been 
providing support to the Georgian government in withdrawal of Russian troops from the 
country, in fighting organized crime, has been monitoring the election process and the 
implementation of human rights (Sagramoso, 2003). However, according to some 
scholars, as international organizations, the UN and the OSCE are state-biased, thus 
oppose the secessionism. This in turn resulted in loss of credibility among the Abkhaz 
and South Ossetes (Tocci, 2007).       
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The NATO’s involvement in the region was very significant. The most activities were 
done through the NATO program Partnership for Peace (PfP) established in 1994, 
which had a primary aim of intensifying the political and military cooperation with non-
NATO states in Europe, promoting stability and peace, effectuating the defence in the 
non-member states among other things. In the framework of this program, numerous 
projects were implemented in Georgia. The NATO has assisted Georgia in making the 
military more transparent, efficient and effective. The NATO’s strategy towards the 
non-member states was based on a belief that the “…European security was indivisible 
and that only through cooperation with non-NATO members would security and 
stability throughout European continent be ensured” (Sagramoso, 2003: 82).  
 
Nevertheless, despite all the efforts made by the NATO, it had never really participated 
in the defence of its partner. The NATO member countries were not directly involved in 
the conflict and did not stop the violence in Abkhazia and South Ossetian conflicts. 
Neither did it participate in the peacekeeping operations. Moreover, the NATO 
members have not defined a clear policy towards Georgia on whether they will protect 
Georgia if future conflicts occur, and whether Georgia will become a member of the 
NATO (Sagramoso, 2003). 
 
Despite the fact that the abovementioned international organizations have failed 
establishing peace in Georgia, it is undeniable that their assistance to the area was 
tremendous. Whereas some actors, as the UN, have made efforts towards providing the 
area with humanitarian aid, others have contributed to promotion of democracy, 
freedom of speech and press, economic development.  
 
In the following section, a presentation on development of CFSP, ESS and ENP will be 
provided.  
 
4.3 Development of the Common Foreign and Security policy 
 
The end of the Second World War and the increasing Cold War tensions reflected the 
European Community’s (EC) desire to cooperate in order to construct peaceful and 
prosperous Western Europe and to regain some of international influence lost by 
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Western European states individually (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). From the very 
beginning the competences of the EC in the field of international economic policy were 
limited and it was almost nonexistent in the field of foreign policy, which was 
understood as the “high politics” of diplomacy, defence and security. 
 
In order to balance the EC’s economic policy, the European Political Cooperation 
(EPC) was established by the adoption of Luxembourg Report in 1969 with the aim of 
providing mechanisms for EC’s Member state foreign policy cooperation and 
coordination. However, the EPC was merely a forum, where the six foreign ministers 
from the EC member states discussed certain foreign policy issues, possibly to 
harmonise the member states views, and when feasible to undertake common action 
(Strömvik, 2005). The EPC was very limited and informal arrangement without Treaty 
base, with lack of any form of compliance mechanisms, and with no permanent budget 
and secretariat (Strömvik, 2005). In the early years of the EPC, administrative support 
was provided by the country holding the Presidency4, which placed a heavy burden on 
national officials and caused problems of establishing a collective, institutional 
memory. It was not until EPC’s codification in the 1986 Single European Act (SEA) 
that its Secretariat was established in Brussels, with the aim of enhancing the EPC. The 
Secretariat, however, was not a permanent body and lacked the resources necessary to 
play a proactive policy role (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999).  
 
Generally speaking, the EPC through the 15 years of its existence did not pose any 
threat to the national foreign policies of the Member states, and its aim to coordinate 
Member states’ foreign policy was modest due to the highly elaborate and time 
consuming procedures (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). Especially lack of agreement 
between the Member states has been the most significant obstacle to the formulation of 
coherent foreign policy. A number of crises triggered by the end of the Cold War, 
highlighted the shortcomings of the EPC and suggested the need for more robust foreign 
policy system (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999). 
 
                                                 
4 Each Presidency lasted only six month and there by was seen as an impediment to EPC’s effectiveness.  
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During the 1990’s the political instability in the Eastern Europe and Balkans, both 
within and outside Europe, raised expectations that the EC would play a central role in 
maintaining peace and stability in Europe as a whole, were growing (Wallace, 2005). 
The existing situation in 1990’s with the conflict escalation in Yugoslavia, the Political 
Union in IGC concluded in December 1991 the Treaty of European Union (TEU), 
which entered into force in 1993. The TEU included the provisions that replaced the 
EPC with a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and the principles, substance 
and procedures of the cooperation were all expanded and altered (Strömvik, 2005). It 
was also for the first time that the objectives of the foreign policy were laid in the 
Treaty. The TEU included objectives such as conflict resolution and strengthening 
international security, promotion of the regional cooperation, combating international 
crime and promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Article J.1). With 
the TEU, for the first time there was an explicit goal to admit and include the defence 
dimension into the new framework of CFSP. In order to achieve this aim, the Western 
European Union (WEU) was declared to be “an integral part of the Union” (TEU 
Art.J.4). The inclusion of the defence dimension in the TEU represented an important 
shift away from the totally civilian nature of the EC.  
 
In contrary to the previous texts, the TEU specified the possible content of the common 
policies (Strömvik, 2005). The aim of collective foreign policy was to promote the 
international cooperation and to “develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of 
law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms” (TEU, Art. J. I. 2). 
Furthermore, the normative engagement in external activities is expressed in founding 
principles of the Union set out in the TEU. Nevertheless, the TEU stated that the CFSP 
was meant to reinforce “the European identity and its independence in order to promote 
peace, security and progress in Europe and the world” (TEU). There was also a broad 
acceptance of overall coordination of external activities and the TEU Common 
Provisions stipulated that “the Union shall in particular ensure the consistency of its 
external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the 
Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency” (Bretherton and 
Vogler, 1999: 179).  
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Due to the fact, that the CFSP was not incorporated in the Pillar I, but in Pillar II, the 
Community method of decision making could not be applied. Thereby, the CFSP 
remained intergovernmental and most of the decisions were taken by unanimity in the 
Council. The qualified majority voting (QMV) could be applied in general to procedural 
questions, however it could be also applied to implementation of joint actions if the 
Council first had agreed unanimously to do so (TEU, Art. J.3.2). Policy initiative, 
representation and implementation were explicitly reserved to the Council presidency, 
however, the previous or the next Member state to hold the presidency, could assist if 
needed. The Commission’s role in the CFSP was strengthened by the TEU provisions, 
where it stated that the Commission could be “associated” with the other Member state 
work in CFSP, as it was given the right of initiative and to request emergency meetings 
according to the crisis procedure (Strömvik, 2005). Other important changes were that 
the Council Secretariat should cover the CFSP issues and that the administrative 
expenditure was now charged to the budget of the European Community, however the 
operational expenditures could be charged either to Community or to the Member 
states.  
 
As the CFSP failed to progress towards a more positive and coordinated approach to 
external policy, provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty (ToA) in 1997 were to increase the 
effectiveness of the policy formulation through clarifications and reinforcement of the 
TEU provisions. The provisions guiding the CFSP were changed in several ways, and 
only the general principles and the motivation of the CFSP remained mostly unchanged. 
The significant revision to the CFSP was that the European Council was given 
responsibility to “decide on common strategies to be implemented by the Union in areas 
where Member states have important interests in common” (Art. 13.2), and these 
“common strategies” should be framed by the European Council as guidance to foreign 
ministers of Member states. The Council was also charged with adopting joint actions 
and common positions in order to give effect to an adopted common strategy. 
Furthermore, in attempt to increase the effectiveness of policy making, joint actions and 
common positions are more carefully defined. Where joint actions are intended to deal 
with “specific situations where operational action by the Union is required” (Art. 14.1), 
common positions are seen in a broader way, thus they “shall define the approach of the 
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Union to a particular matter of a geographic or thematic nature” (Art. 15). In regard to 
the centralisation aspect, the Amsterdam Treaty established the High Representative, 
which now assists the Council in CFSP matters through contributing to the formulation 
preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and through carrying out political 
dialogue with third parties (Wallace, 2005). 
 
A final important amendment made by the ToA was revisions of the provisions on 
defence. In the TEU the “eventual framing of a common defence policy”, was amended 
to “progressive framing of common defence policy” (Strömvik, 2005: 112). There was 
intention to integrate the WEU into the Union and the cooperation in the field of 
armaments was mentioned for the first time in the CFSP provisions. The ToA also 
introduced so-called “Petersburg tasks” specifying that the tasks for the common 
defence policy should include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping and tasks 
of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (Wallace, 2005). 
Through a revived WEU, the European security interests were distinguished from those 
of NATO as a whole. In 1999 the EU made formal decisions at Cologne and Helsinki to 
set up the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in parallel with the CFSP in 
order to take over most of the WEU’s functions in due course, and to provide the EU 
with Rapid Reaction Force of 60,000 men by 2003 (Hill, 2001). It was concluded by the 
Cologne Council that “the Council should have the ability to take decisions on the full 
range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the Treaty on 
European Union, the ‘Petersburg tasks’” (Hill, 2001: 320).  
 
The Treaty of Nice in 2000 did not make significant changes to the detailed provisions 
of the CFSP, but it made important changes when introducing the military aspects of the 
EU’s external policies (Smith, 2006). It is worth mentioning that with the Reform 
Treaty (if and when it will be ratified) the EU’s role in the international scene “shall be 
guided by the principals inspired by its own creation, development and enlargement’ 
and which it seeks to advance in the wider world” (Art. 10a). The principles of the 
Union in the Reform Treaty are the same as outlined in previous EC/EU treaties: 
democracy, rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and 
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solidarity, and the respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
international law. It is also important to mention that the Reform Treaty Article 10a 
implies that the Union shall ensure consistency between different areas of its external 
actions and between these and its other policies. 
 
4.4 European Security Strategy  
 
In the EU’s foreign policy landscape another instrument, which needs to be presented, is 
the European Security Strategy (ESS), launched in 2003 by the European Council. The 
ESS was a major step for the EU, in the sense that it was for the first time when member 
states adopted a common strategic policy for the whole of the EU foreign policy 
(Biscop in Hauser and Kernic, 2006). The main focus of the Strategy is to tackle threats 
both internally and externally. The Strategy defines three strategic objectives as 
Addressing the Threats, Building Security in our Neighbourhood and International 
order based on effective Multilateralism.  
 
In regard to the first objective the Strategy states that the EU needs to address the threats 
abroad before they reach the borders of the EU. In this context the Security Strategy 
paper is mentioning “…distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near 
at hand … With the new threats, the thirst line of defence will often be abroad. The new 
threats are dynamic …This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis 
occurs…” (ESS, 2003:6) 
 
Within the second objective the ESS states that “it is in the European interest that 
countries in our borders are well governed” (ESS, 2003: 7). More than that, the EU 
needs to extend its “benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in 
the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and 
more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus ….” (ESS, 2003: 8).  
 
The third objective of creating a more efficient multilateral system reflects in the 
Strategy that “The development of a stronger international society, well functioning 
international institutions and a rule based international order...” (ESS, 2003: 9). This is 
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to be done in collaboration with the EU and other international organizations, such as 
OSCE, Council of Europe etc. Furthermore, the EU together with other institutions 
could inspire other countries with theirs values and objectives. This could be done in the 
terms of Security Strategy by “spreading good governance, supporting social and 
political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of 
law and protecting human rights …” (ESS, 2003: 11).  
   
Finally, the ESS is not just a security policy but it covers in effect the whole of EU 
foreign policy, across the pillars, from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. 
According to Biscop and Andersson, the ESS has the potential to have a durable impact 
on the future of EU foreign policy (Biscop, 2006). 
 
4.5 The European Neighborhood Policy 
 
The European Neighborhood Policy was outlined by the Commission in 2003 and it was 
launched in the same year as the ESS. According to Roland Dannreuther “the 
development and the promotion of the ENP might not have emerged solely from the 
strategic impulse of the ESS but it was certainly influenced by this” (Dannreuther 
quoted in Biscop and Andersson, 2007: 63). This policy calls for a single, 
comprehensive strategy for its Eastern, South-Eastern and Southern neighbors or as 
Romano Prodi referred to “as a ring of friends surrounding the Union” (Prodi, 2002: 5-
6). Furthermore, the ENP is designed to offer more than partnership and less than 
membership. The objective of the ENP is “to share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 
enlargement with neighboring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-
being for all concerned” (European Commission, 2004: 3).  
 
These objectives of the ENP are to be met by building up a mutual commitment to 
common values, which are: democracy and human rights, rule of law, good 
governance, market economy and sustainable development principles5. Furthermore, in 
the ENP it is stated that “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
dignity, liberty, equality,… The Union's aim is to promote peace, its values and the 
                                                 
5 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/policy_en.htm - 10.12.2007 
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well-being of its peoples. In its relations with the wider world, it aims at upholding and 
promoting these values.” (European Commission, 2004: 12).  
 
The ENP was designed to prevent a demarcation line between the enlarged EU and its 
neighbors and to offer them the possibility to participate in different EU activities 
through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation. The paper is also 
emphasizing the EU’s contribution to “reinforce stability and security and contribute to 
efforts at conflict resolution” (European Commission, 2004: 4).  
  
The European Neighborhood Policy is applied to the EU's immediate neighbors by land 
or sea6. The ENP introduces the so-called concept of “political conditionality”, i.e. 
neighbors that perform well will get access to extra money and benefits from the EU. 
As the Commission states: “The partnership is designed in such a way as to reward 
progress with greater incentives and benefits, which are entirely distinct from any 
prospect of accession. How far and how fast each partner progresses in its relationship 
with the EU depends on its capacity and political will to implement the agreed 
priorities.”(European Commission, 2004: 2). More deeply this is stated in the 
Commission Wider Europe Communication where it is said “The extension of the 
benefits [...], including increased financial assistance, should be conducted so as to 
encourage and reward reform … Engagement should therefore be introduced 
progressively, and be conditional on meeting agreed targets for reform… In the 
absence of progress, partners will not be offered these opportunities.” (Communication, 
2003: 16). 
 
The aims of the European Neighborhood Policy are matched by adequate financial and 
technical support. These financial instruments are designed in a way to support the 
implementation of the ENP. Until 31 December 2006 EC assistance towards the 
neighborhood countries in the Eastern Europe were provided under different 
geographical programs, such as TACIS (technical assistance for eastern neighbors) and 
EIDHR (European initiative for democracy and human rights). From 2007 these 
                                                 
6 Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, 
Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine.  
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programs were replaced by a single instrument – the European Neighborhood and 
Partnership Instrument (ENPI).7                            
  
The main element of the ENP is the bilateral ENP Action Plan agreed between the EU 
and each country. In this context the ENP Strategy Paper states that “The Action Plans 
will draw on a common set of principles but will be differentiated, reflecting the 
existing state of relations with each country, its needs and capacities, as well as 
common interests.” (European Commission, 2004: 3). Furthermore, the Action Plans 
“will provide a point of reference for the programming of assistance to the countries 
concerned. Assistance from existing sources will be complemented in the future by 
support from the European Neighborhood Instrument.” (European Commission, 2004: 
4).  
 
The Action Plans are covering two large areas: first, commitments to specific actions 
which confirm or strengthen adherence to shared values and to certain objectives in the 
area of foreign and security policy; secondly, commitments to actions which will bring 
partner countries closer to the EU in a number of priority fields. In this context it is 
emphasized that “A clear time horizon will be given for addressing these different 
priorities.” (European Commission, 2004: 10). 
 
Further we will present the actions of the EU in Georgia and in the secessionist entities.  
 
4.6 The EU instruments and policies towards Georgia and the 
secessionist entities  
 
The EU policies towards Georgia and secessionist conflicts are framed into two levels. 
At the first level the EU supports Georgia’s transformation and reforms, which could 
make Georgia more attractive to secessionist entities. At the second level the EU 
policies target the secessionist entities-Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the following we 
are going to present these two levels of EU policies.     
 
                                                 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/funding_en.htm - 10.11.2007 
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4.6.1 EU’s instruments towards Georgia  
 
1992-2003 
The EU policies and instruments towards Georgia started with the signing of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1996, brought into force in 1999. The 
PCA included an institutionalised mechanism for political dialogue and incorporated 
also provisions on trade, economic cooperation, culture and technology. In this context 
the PCA towards Georgia states the following objectives of the agreement: 
 
“– to provide an appropriate framework for the political dialogue between the Parties 
allowing the development of political relations; 
– to support Georgia's efforts to consolidate its democracy and to develop its economy 
and to complete the transition into a market economy; 
– to promote trade and investment and harmonious economic relations between the 
Parties and so to foster their sustainable economic development; 
– to provide a basis for legislative, economic, social, financial, civil scientific, 
technological and cultural cooperation”8. 
 
Beyond the PCA, the EU implemented financial assistance for Georgia through TACIS 
(Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States). This instrument 
focussed mainly on supporting rule of law, good governance, human rights, democracy, 
poverty reduction and conflict prevention and rehabilitation (Tocci, 2007). Georgia is 
benefiting from financial and technical assistance until 2007. Georgia was also included 
in the EU regional programme called Traceca (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus –
Asia) and Inogate (Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) to support cooperation in oil and 
gas infrastructure systems (Lynch, 2006).  
 
Between 1992-1994 the EU has also provided humanitarian financial assistance through 
ECHO (European Commission Humanitarian Office) and food aid through the FSP 
(Food Security Programme). (Lynch, 2006). More than that Georgia was one of the 29 
countries which benefited from European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights 
                                                 
8 http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_georgia.pdf - 10.11.2007 
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(EIDHR) in 2002-2004. In addition, in the late 1990’s the EU also agreed on a number 
of CFSP Joint actions towards Georgia, with having the scope in rehabilitation of the 
conflict zone in South Ossetia (Tocci, 2007).  
  
Since the involvement with Georgia, the EU has primarily been an aid provider rather 
than a political actor. Regarding to the conflict resolution in the region Popescu argues 
that “it is relatively difficult to talk of an EU policy towards the conflicts in the South 
Caucasus in the 1990. There was virtually none.” (Popescu, 2007: 4). More than that, 
the same author states that “In some respects the 1990’s-style of the EU policy towards 
Georgia ended in 2003” (Popescu, 2007: 4).  
 
2003-2007 
What was changed after 2003 in EU’s policy style towards Georgia was a new sense of 
urgency for the EU to start engaging in this zone. The above changes in EU policy style 
were a direct result of launching the ENP and the adoption of ESS, where the EU’s 
attention on the south Caucasus was particularly mentioned. Even though, Georgia was 
not included in the ENP in 2003, the ESS clearly stated that the EU “should now take a 
stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus” (European 
Commission, 2003: 8). Georgia was included in the ENP in 2004. Moreover, the EU 
policies towards Georgia after 2003 were emphasising more on conflict resolution in the 
area, as a condition for sustainable economic and social development. The Commission 
declared, “The EU wants Georgia to develop in the context of a politically stable and 
economically prosperous Southern Caucasus. In this respect, the conflicts in Abkhazia 
(Georgia) and Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia remain a major impediment.” (European 
Commission, Country Strategy Paper 2003-2006: Georgia, September 2003: 4).  
 
Under the ENP, Georgia agreed on a joint Action Plan for reforms and cooperation in 
November 2006. According to the ENP/AP Paper towards Georgia, “Georgia is invited 
to enter into intensified political, security, economic and cultural relations with the EU, 
enhanced regional and cross border co-operation and shared responsibility in conflict 
prevention and conflict resolution.” (EU/Georgia ENP Action Plan 2006: 1).  
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The Action Plan designed towards Georgia also emphasized that the EU is taking into 
consideration Georgia’s expressed European aspirations and thus “The EU welcomes 
Georgia’s readiness to enhance cooperation in all domains covered by the Action Plan. 
The level of ambition of the relationship will depend on the degree of Georgia’s 
commitment to common values as well as its capacity to implement jointly agreed 
priorities, in compliance with international and European norms and principles.” 
(EU/Georgia ENP Action Plan 2006: 1).  
 
The Actions Plan is framed in the following way. It sets out a range of priorities in areas 
within and beyond the scope of the PCA. Among these priorities particular attentions is 
given to the following areas:  
-Strengthening the rule of law and democratic institutions, human rights and 
fundamental freedoms;   
-Improve the business and investment climate; 
- Encourage economic development, sustainable development, eradication of poverty 
and social cohesion; 
-Cooperation in the field of justice, freedom and security; 
 -Strengthen regional cooperation; 
-Promote peaceful resolution of internal conflicts; 
-Cooperation on Foreign and Security policy; 
- Transport and Energy. (EU/Georgia ENP Action Plan 2006) 
 
The conflict resolution provisions were mentioned in the Action Plan as Priority Area 6 
(Even though Tbilisi demanded the “peaceful resolution of internal conflicts” to be the 
first priority in its Action Plan). In this respect the EU mentioned that it is ready to 
“Contribute to the conflicts settlement in Abkhazia, Georgia and Tskinvali 
Region/South Ossetia, Georgia, based on respect of the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders.” (EU/Georgia ENP 
Action Plan 2006: 10). The ENP Action Plan is also mentioning that EU needs to 
“contribute actively, and in any relevant forum, to accelerating the process of 
demilitarisation and of conflict resolution” and “to increase the effectiveness of the 
negotiating mechanisms” (EU/Georgia Action Plan 2006: 10).  
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Another type of EU policy towards Georgia, designed for conflict resolution issues, has 
been the actions undertaken under CFSP/ESDP. These included the so-called Rule of 
Law mission (EUJUST THEMIS) launched on 14 July 2004 and the EUSR Border 
Support Team in Tbilisi. 
 
European involvement increased since Georgian “rose revolution”. Immediately after 
Saakashvili’s election the Council stated that “the EU now looks forward to helping 
Georgia and the other countries of the South Caucasus come closer to the European 
family” and the EU is aiming to “assist the new government in its efforts to bring local 
standards with regard to rule of law closer to international and EU standards” as well as 
to “embed stability in the region” (Council, 2004: 1). In July 2004, under the Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism, the EU deployed a rule of law mission in order to assist Georgian 
efforts to reform in the judiciary sphere (Lynch, 2006).  
 
In 2003 the Council appointed the EU Special Representative (EUSR) for South 
Caucasus (which is one of the only 5 EU Special Representatives operating outside the 
Balkans) (International Crisis Group Report no 173, 2006: 22). The EUSR’s broad 
mandate includes support to political and economic reforms, conflict prevention and 
resolution. In the beginning, the EUSR task vis-à-vis conflict resolution was to “assist9 
in conflict resolution, in particular to enable the EU to better support the United Nations 
… the OSCE” (Council, Article 3(d), 2003: 74). Later on the mandate was strengthened 
in the new Joint Action from 2006 were it is stated that EUSR can “contribute10 to the 
settlement of conflicts and…. facilitate the implementation of such settlement in close 
coordination with the UN” (Council, Article 3(d), 2003: 15).   
 
The EUSR Border Support Team was established after EU’s failing to deploy a full 
border mission. This occurred in the following circumstances. When the OSCE Border 
Monitoring Operation (BMO) in Georgia11 terminated its mandate in the early 2005 and 
Russia vetoed its continuation, Georgian officials asked the EU officials to take over the 
ended OSCE BMO and conduct a similar operation under EU ruling (Lynch, 2006). In 
                                                 
9 stress added  
10 stress added 
11 The OSCE BMO was monitoring the Russian-Georgian border.  
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response to it and after months of bargaining, the EU sent three EU borders experts to 
advise Georgia on border reform.12 Failing to deploy a full ESDP border mission, the 
new team of experts was deployed under the EUSR. The number of experts was 
increased in September 2005 and February 2006 (Popescu, 2007). The purpose of 
EUSR Border Support Team, as mentioned in the Council Joint Action was to “provide 
the European Union with reporting and a continued assessment of the border situation 
and to facilitate confidence - building between Georgia and the Russian Federation, 
thereby ensuring efficient cooperation and liaison with all relevant actors…” (Council 
Joint Action, 2006: 2) 
 
4.6.2 EU instruments towards secessionist entities  
 
The EU’s efforts to tackle the conflicts in Georgia have been done through 
rehabilitation assistance. Such activities were financed by the Commission from 1997. 
In this context EU’s objectives of providing assistance is “to build greater trust between 
the conflict –affected populations ,… improving living conditions of the population 
affected by the conflict and creating conditions for the return of internally displaced 
persons, as well as facilitating progress in a constructive dialogue between the conflict 
parties”13.   
 
Since 2006 the EU has become the largest international donor to both regions. The EU 
funded projects were technical in nature and have been as depoliticised as possible. 
These projects have not been conditional on progress in the conflict resolution process 
(Popescu, 2007). These projects in Abkhazia focused on economic rehabilitation and 
humanitarian assistance. The EU supported also civil society development and 
confidence–building measures. In the case of South Ossetia, the EU financed projects 
concerning the rehabilitation of drinkable water supply networks, rehabilitation of 
schools, electricity and gas networks, railways, support for agricultural development. 
                                                 
12 Member states did not agree on a follow-up operational mission. The lack of political consensus was 
caused particularly by France, Greece and Italy hesitance. 
13 www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/programmes/rehabilitation.html - 01.12.2007 
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More than that, in this region the projects were tied to the political process dialogue 
within the JCC, with implementation dependent on agreement of its four parties.14 
 
Summing up, the EU’s financial assistance towards Georgia and the conflict zones from 
early 1990’s until 2006 is represented in Table 115. Besides the figures presented in the 
Table 1, Georgia benefits from grants under the TACIS Regional Programme-Traceca, 
Inogate, Natural Resources. 
  
 1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 2005 2006 1992 
2006 
TACIS 13 10 16 16 15 14 27 0 20 131 
ECHO 12 45 16 13 4 4 4 1  99 
FEOGA 
(food aid) 
- 41 22 - - - - -  63 
Exceptional 
humanitarian 
assistance  
6 - - - - - - - 0 6 
Food security 
Programme  
- - 34 12 13  12 10 10 91 
Rehabilitation 
in conflct 
zone 
- - 8 4 5 - 2 2 2 23 
Macro  
Financial  
Assistance 
- - - 19 6 - 7  33 65 
CFSP and 
RRM* 
- - - - 2 2 5   9 
European 
Initiative for 
Democracy 
And human 
Rights  
- - - - - 2 2 2 3.9 9.9 
Other 
instruments  
- - - 4   2 1 2 9 
Total 31 96 96 68 45 22 61 16 70.9 505-9 
 
 
Table 1. The CFSP budget of the EC it is used to finance the activities of the EU 
Special representative for Caucasus and the rule of law mission in Georgia-EUJUST 
Themis.  
 
                                                 
14 This included Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia and Russia 
15 www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/eu_and_georgia/cooperation.html - 01.12.2007 
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5 Analysis 
 
In the analysis, we are going to identify the EU’s normative nature towards Georgia 
through its policies and instruments. First of all we will look at the relation of the EU to 
Georgia from the civilian, military and normative power perspectives. We will analyse 
whether the EU acts in a normative way in conflict resolution in Georgia, emphasizing 
mainly on the European Neighbourhood Policy. Here we will look at whether the 9 
principles of the Union, defined in the internal policy instruments of the EU, are 
reflected in the foreign policy instruments, directed towards Georgia, such as ENP. This 
will lead us to see the intentions or the discourse of the Union towards the third parties 
and will help us testify whether the EU is coherent in its internal and outer policies in 
the particular case of Georgia. In this analysis we will discuss not only the ENP, but 
also other instruments of the EU, which are used in Georgia, such as development, 
technical and humanitarian aids. Moreover, we take the view of Ian Manners that 
having a discourse or “acting good” towards the third parties is not enough, and that the 
EU has to “do good” or to realize this discourse. Therefore the concept of the 
Europeanization will be used as an instrument of realization of the discourse of the EU 
in Georgian conflict.   
 
5.1 Normativity of the EU 
    
The civilian power argument assumes that this power is used for the sake of national 
interest and only for own benefit. Although it is difficult to reject the argument that by 
spreading the values and norms the EU is acting with the strategy on the back of the 
mind, it doesn’t seem to be right the case in the EU involvement in Georgia. In the case 
of the EU involvement in Georgia, one can say that the EU clearly has interests in the 
area, which is rich in mineral resources, and most importantly because of the energy 
routes situated in the area. It is obvious that the EU would like to be independent from 
Russia’s energy resources and in order to be so it is interested in alternative resources. 
Moreover, if Turkey will enter the Union at some point, Georgia will be one of the 
direct neighbours to the EU by land. This means that it is in the interest of the EU to 
have a peaceful neighbour and will in fact involve in the conflict resolution. This would 
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mean that the EU is not entirely altruistic in its ways and motives. However, here one 
should remember that the request for inclusion in the Neighbourhood policy came from 
the Georgian side and that it was not the EU which came up with the first initiative. 
Therefore we will argue here that the EU demonstrates itself as a normative power 
rather than a civilian.  
 
Furthermore, we see that the EU did not act in military way; it has, in fact, acted 
normatively. Comparing these actions of the EU in Georgia with other actors, involved 
in the conflict resolution, such as Russia, we can state that the means considerably 
differ. In the Georgian secessionist conflict Russia has widely used military instruments 
alongside the economic and legal means, whereas the EU has been involved in the 
conflict resolution in the area using more economic and normative means, such as 
technical and humanitarian assistance and the ENP Action plans.   
 
Moreover, legitimacy of the EU actions towards Georgia can be validated according to 
the following. As mentioned above, Georgia has come with the first initiative to be 
included in the ENP. This suggests that Georgia recognizes and accepts norms and 
values of the Union. This means that in order to justify the validity and legitimacy of the 
norms and values, it is necessary that all the parties have shared values and recognize 
each others norms.  
 
As mentioned in the Normative Power approach section, the EU rests upon 9 principles, 
such as peace, liberty, human rights, rule of law, democracy, good governance, social 
progress, sustainable development and combating the discrimination, which as we 
already know, have their legal basis in the Treaties, laws and other documents of the 
Union. However, it is not enough to have these principles in the treaties and laws which 
function internally within the EU: these should be also incorporated into the legal and 
other instruments towards the third parties, that is, in our case, to the ENP. The internal 
dynamics of the policy formulation should be consistent with the external peripheries as 
well. The reflection of these norms in the foreign policy instruments illustrates the 
discourse of the EU towards the third parties. Therefore in the following we will 
demonstrate the reflection of these nine principles mainly in the ENP.  
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Before emphasizing on the ENP, we have to mention here that the EU has been 
promoting its norms and values through previously launched instruments, such as the 
PCA and other. For instance, already from the beginning of 1990’s where Georgia was 
incorporated into the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, which was 
aimed at promotion of human rights and democracy. Moreover, the PCA signed in 1996 
and having effect from 1999, has stated that the promotion of democracy, rule of law, 
good governance, human rights as objective of the agreement.  
 
The ENP clearly states that the core principles as human rights and freedoms must be 
fulfilled according to the other international treaties. “The Union’s neighbours have 
pledged adherence to fundamental human rights and freedoms, through their adherence 
to a number of multilateral treaties as well as through their bilateral agreements with the 
EU.” (European Commission, 2004: 12-13) As mentioned previously, this commitment 
to international law strengthens the legitimacy of the EU actions. Moreover, the ENP 
stresses that “All the EU’s neighbours are signatories of UN human rights conventions. 
Some are members of the Council of Europe and OSCE and have ratified the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and 
committed themselves to adhere to relevant conventions and bodies setting high 
democratic and human rights standards as well as to accept strong and legally binding 
mechanisms to ensure that they comply with human rights obligations”, which implies 
that the EU neighbours are also bound by the international treaties, and thus have to act 
according to these (European Commission, 2004: 12-13). This also entails that the EU is 
not imposing its own norms, but simply relying on shared norms and on other 
international laws, to which the third parties are signatories. This also refers to Georgia, 
which is a member of Council of Europe as well as the OSCE, not to mention that it is a 
signatory to a number of international treaties. Moreover, the ENP stresses on the 
importance of compliance with the international laws, such as United Nations Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO conventions among others.  
 
The ENP emphasizes on the priorities of the action plans as to “strengthen commitment 
to these values” (European Commission, 2004: 13). These values include democracy 
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and the rule of law, respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Moreover, the 
ENP puts the reinforcement of “stability and security and contribute to efforts at conflict 
resolution” as goals of the policy (European Commission, 2004: 4). Moreover, the ENP 
refers to the ESS, where the EU tasks are defined as to “make a particular contribution 
to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood [and] to promote a 
ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of 
the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations” (European 
Commission, 2004: 6). 
 
Here we can draw a conclusion that the Union reflects its norms and values in one of its 
foreign policy instruments, as ENP, and declares as the aim of the Union promotion of 
these values in the wider world. “The Union is founded on the values of respect for 
human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination. The Union's aim is to promote 
peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples. In its relations with the wider world, 
it aims at upholding and promoting these values.” (European Commission, 2004: 12).  
 
In relation to Caucasus, or specifically to Georgia, the ENP states that the EU “wishes 
to see reinforced, credible and sustained commitment towards democracy, the rule of 
law, respect for human rights, and progress towards the development of a market 
economy. These common values also underlie the membership of Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia in the Council of Europe and OSCE”. (European Commission, 2004: 11). 
We can see from the above that the EU has established the discourse through the ENP 
towards the third parties, including Georgia. However, according to Manners’ 
theoretical approach of Normative Power it is not enough “to act good”, in other words, 
to have only a discourse. It is necessary to realize this discourse into action, or “doing 
good”. Therefore, in the following we will provide an analysis of the actions taken 
towards Georgia using the Europeanization approaches instruments of conditionality 
and social learning.  
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5.2 Europeanization  
 
Based on the normative assumption that Europeanization can have an impact on conflict 
resolution in Georgia this section assesses the way in which the EU made use of 
conditionality and social learning mechanisms in conflict resolution Georgia. Thus we 
are going to analyse how EU is exporting its norms through the mechanism of 
conditionality and social learning. When explaining the impact of these instruments the 
following determinants are taken into consideration: the value of benefit with reflection 
on objective /subjective values and timing, and another determinant is the credibility of 
EU’s obligations. 
 
The EU sees that “its main contribution to conflict resolution should be assisting 
Georgia create a state based on European values and standards, which ultimately could 
be more attractive to South Ossetia and Abkhazia than independence or close 
integration with Russia” (International Crisis Group Report No. 173, 2006: 11). In this 
way the EU hopes to adjust the strategic position of domestic actors.  
 
In the case of Georgia the EU has acknowledged through its policies that human rights, 
the rule of law, a vibrant civil society, strong institutions and economic development are 
the key elements of conflict resolution. As mentioned in the empirical part, the first type 
of contribution towards conflict resolution in Georgia has been through rehabilitation 
assistance. By this the EU aimed “to built greater trust between the conflict –affected 
populations, …improving living conditions of the population affected by the conflict 
and creating conditions for the return of internally displaced process, as well as 
facilitating progress in a constructive dialogue between the conflict parties” (Overview 
of European Commission Assistance in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, July 2006)16. In 
this context EU rehabilitation assistance was intended to mobilize the domestic actors in 
building a constructive dialogue towards conflict resolution. In the case of Abkhazia the 
EU funded projects were not conditional on progress in the conflict resolution, they 
were mainly concerning economic rehabilitation, capacity-building for NGOs and 
support of civil society dialogue with the authorities. Comparing the EU involvement in 
                                                 
16 www.delgeo.cec.eu.int/en/programmes /rehabilitation.html – 12.12.2007 
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Abkhazia with the EU involvement in South Ossetia, there were some differences in the 
EU approach. The EU’s assistance in South Ossetia has been more coordinated with the 
conflict settlement, some of the financial assistance being made conditional on 
agreement between the conflict parties in the JCC. The EU’s conditionality in this 
context implied that “disbursement of financial aid provided …will be conditional upon 
the holding of regular meetings of the JCC and the other mechanisms in the JCC 
framework …Both the Georgian and South Ossetian sides should make demonstrable 
efforts to achieve real political progress towards a lasting and peaceful settlement of 
their differences” (Draft Council Joint Action, 2006: 1)17. 
 
When looking at PCA towards Georgia the main essential clauses referred to 
democracy, human rights, economic development it is important to mention that they 
were not used to exert ex post conditionality on either Georgia or Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. However, the EU made use of its ex ante aid conditionality. Thus in the 
Georgia’s Country Strategy Paper it is mentioned that because “the Georgian 
government has not yet shown the level of commitment to reaching the policy 
objectives linked to assistance which the EU may legitimate expect” (Georgia’s Country 
Strategy Paper, 2003: 21) the Commission needs to strengthen TACIS conditionality in 
the areas of governance, rule of law human rights and progress in peace process. In this 
regard it was mentioned “the effectiveness of conditionality will be strengthened so that 
assistance will be made more conditional upon reaching jointly defined objectives and 
enhance ownership of the projects” (Country Strategy Paper, 2003: 25). This mean that 
the Commission would target mainly the areas where the Georgian authorities would 
show effective commitment to reform. Thus, because of lack of reforms in some certain 
areas the Commission dropped its annual assistance from 47 € to 16 € in 2002 (Country 
Strategy Paper, 2003: 40). One can ask how the EU can still be normative if it is 
conditioning the reforms in Georgia on financial aid and thus cutting it if the country is 
not reaching the objectives of reforms. In this context we argue that EU’s normative 
power is not weakened, if EU is changing its instruments when the existing EU 
instruments do not lead to domestic change. Rather, by this, the EU is strengthening the 
incentives of Georgia towards reforms and thus this could just lead to simple learning.  
                                                 
17 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st10/st10506.en06pdf - 12.12.2007 
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5.2.1 EU conditionality  
 
In spite of reduction of aid in 2002 the EU continued its assistance to Georgia after its 
“rose revolution” because of the new regime’s greater commitment to reform. As we 
can see from our empirical data the annual aid average of 28 € in the period of 1991 to 
2002 rose to 46 € in 2004-2005.  
 
Even though aid conditionality towards Georgia has been consistent and so responding 
to the needs in domestic reforms this lead neither to considerable domestic changes nor 
it affected significantly the peace process. Therefore in Georgia conditionality followed 
rather than led to domestic change.  
 
In the ENP, the EU did not make use of conditionality as such. The financial aid is not 
conditioned on peace process and neither is commitment to reform. However in the 
ENP AP paper is established that “The level of ambition of the relationship will depend 
on the degree of Georgia’s commitment to common values as well as its capacity to 
implement jointly agreed priorities, in compliance with international and European 
norms and principles. The pace of progress of the relationship will acknowledge fully 
Georgia’s efforts and concrete achievements in meeting those commitments.” (EU 
Georgia Action plan) Because the ENP lacks the main benefit that EU can offer – the 
membership - it “makes conditionality much more difficult to practice, especially given 
the vagueness surrounding the ENP incentive package.” (Emerson et al, 2007: 8) In this 
regard the pre-conditions for successful conditionality, as we identified them in the 
enlargement context, are absent in the neighbourhood. The potential rewards, as we can 
observe from the ENP, are neither sizable, nor credible, nor achievable within the near 
future, and the conditions on which they would be delivered are neither precise nor 
clearly established.  
 
After examining on how the EU made use of conditionality instruments, we can see that 
the EU was caught among two alternatives. On one side the EU found itself in a 
position of financing reforms without political conditionality on the peace process and 
by this improving the living conditions on the ground, but with no results on conflict 
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settlement process. On the other side, when the EU qualified its assistance with 
conditions, this did not lead to significant domestic changes either.  
 
In order to see to what extent Europeanization process had an impact on conflict 
resolution in Georgia it is important to examine how Georgia and secessionist parties 
perceive the EU and how they identified themselves with EU values and traditions.  
 
First of all it is important to mention that the EU is seen by secessionist leaders as 
supporting Georgia. In this context it was expressed the opinion that Europe and world 
are arming Georgia against them, the secessionist entities.18 But this point is not shared 
by the civil society activists of secessionist entities. They claim that “the more 
Europeanised and democratised is Georgia, the better for Abkhazia. A real democracy is 
less likely to start a new war.” (Interviews with civil society activists, Sukhumi, March 
2006 in Popescu 2007: 17). In spite of the fact that Abkhazian leaders perceive the EU 
as supporting Georgia, they identify their interest as being European, at least on the 
discourse level it was claimed that they “have one aspiration – to be in Europe. We want 
to live in a European house. And we want openness and dialogue from the EU.” 
(Interview with Sergey Bagapsh, de facto President of Abkhazia, Sukhumi, 21 March 
2006, in Popescu 2007: 18). 
 
Situation is different in South Ossetia were EU’s influence on their discourse is quite 
low. In this sense the most positive perception of EU aspirations among civil society 
activists are manifested in the Alan Parastaev political discourse, who stated: “I am in 
favour of [European] integration. I can declare this on behalf of all the NGOs of South 
Ossetia. But I would like to stress that South Ossetia’s integration into the European 
structures goes hand in hand with integration into Russia.”  (“NPO Yuzhnoi Ossetii 
vystupaut za integratsiiu respubliki a evropeiskie struktury”, Regnum.ru, 4 May 200619. 
 
The remark which needs to be made here is that in spite of EU’s use of conditionality 
towards South Ossetia this did not lead to a change in leaders’ discourse or either to 
                                                 
18 Interview with Beslan Kubrava , Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Abkhazia, 17 
March, interview realized by Popescu   
19 http://www.regnum.ru/news/635032.html - 12.12.2007   
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better negotiation towards the peace process. While in Abkhazia the EU funded projects 
were not conditional on progress in conflict resolution, this had greater implications for 
a change in civil society perceptions of the EU and benefits, which could derive from it.  
 
In the case of Georgia there are more positive perceptions of EU both on the political 
elite level as on the civil society as well. Georgian leaders have stated many times their 
attachment to Europe, in terms of history, geography and culture. For example 
Saakashvili stated: “We Georgians believe we are Europeans because our values and 
cultures are deeply European – so too are those of Ukrainians and other post-Soviet 
citizens. There is no reason why Poles, Germans and Estonians should be free while 
other Europeans are not” (Saakashvili, Europe’s Third Wave of Liberation, Financial 
Times, 20 December 2004 cited in Lynch). On the society level in 2005 a survey among 
Georgians showed that over 80% of Georgians aspire to EU membership (Tocci, 2007). 
  
5.2.2 Social learning 
 
As we mentioned in the section on Europeanization, social learning effects the way 
domestic actors voluntary define their interests and identities through a transformation 
of perceived interests. When social learning occurs, domestic actors should internalize 
the norms and logic of the other system. In our case it is important to investigate the 
channels through which Georgia is able to change their interests and identities. First of 
all, we can say that Georgian parties have ability to alter believes, visions and purposes 
through interaction with EU institutional framework. We can say that the social learning 
occurred when the interaction between Georgia and EU started with a political dialogue 
at the expert level in 1997 promoted by the Cooperation Council, Cooperation 
Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Committee (Tocci, 2007). However, in regard to 
secessionist entities the EU had more limited contact with Abkhaz or Ossetian 
authorities, thereby the extent of influence through dialogue and persuasion can be seen 
to lesser extent or we can say: close to zero.  
 
Not including Georgia in the ENP from the start has hindered the process of social 
learning. This is so due to less institutionalized and less frequent contact between the 
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EU and Georgia. If it was included, the EU would have been able to openly criticize and 
give recommendations and thus be more effective. Since 2004 the incentives for social 
learning have increased due to post- revolution elites of Georgia were trained and 
employed in West. The potential of learning occurred with the EU’s more specific 
involvement in particular sectors, such as the one of judiciary. The EUJUST-THEMIS 
has provided the EU with more detailed obligations in the Georgian Action Plan on 
matters related to the judiciary and rule of law. Moreover, the EU departments were set 
up in several ministries in order to harmonize Georgian legislation with that of EU. 
 
More generally, the inclusion of Georgia in the ENP gave a grater possibility to 
“exposure Georgian officials towards EU institutions, their values and modes of 
operation”, and thereby also the social learning (Tocci, 2007:147). However this was 
not the case of South Abkhaz and South Ossetes.  
 
5.2.3 Impact of EU in Georgia 
 
In this subsection we are going to examine if the Europeanization process through its 
mechanism of conditionality and social learning led to domestic changes in Georgia and 
thus to conflict resolution in particular. Recalling Europeanization approach we will 
look on the impact of EU’s institutions and policies on Georgia and the settlement of the 
conflict through looking at three levels: institutional compliance, changing domestic 
opportunities structures, framing domestic beliefs and expectations.   
 
Generally speaking, the impact of the EU on Georgia and the conflict as such it was 
limited. However, some domestic changes occurred. 
 
When examining the institutional compliance about how EU policies and institutions 
reshaped Georgian policies and institutions it is important to mention that EU’s main 
impact was on judicial system. Thus the EU’s more obvious involvement in the judicial 
system through EUJUST –THEMIS has raised “the potential for domestic change 
through learning”. (Tocci, 2007:147) Moreover, the EUJUST-THEMIS mission has 
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given more detailed recommendations for the EU to reflect in the Action Plan within the 
judiciary and rule of law.   
 
When it comes to the EUSR Border Support Team this had also a limited impact, 
although it has assisted Georgia on the border control matters. However, the EU had an 
impact on Georgian reforms concerning border management system.  
 
When it comes to the changes in domestic structures EU did not have an impact in 
changing the rule of the game in the region. However, the EU had an impact on 
strengthening Georgia position both politically and economically and thus supporting 
democratisation process in Georgia. Financial assistance delivered by EU had 
contributed to economical development in the country and secessionists entities as well. 
The inclusion of Georgia in the ENP has encouraged the country to continue the reform 
processes in the domain of rule of law, democracy, human rights, and strong civil 
society. Moreover, the ENP has created closer relation between the EU and Georgian 
officials, which in turn established a more dynamic interaction between them. 
Furthermore, it gave incentives for social learning. The ENP was warmly welcomed by 
the civil society and the elites of Georgia, as they saw the policy as an instrument of 
developing the democracy, sustainable development and stability. Moreover, the 
Georgian elites regarded the policy as more credible and ambitious mechanism, in 
comparison to the previous actions of the EU towards the country. A result of this social 
learning, we believe, is the establishment of the Commission of Georgian integration in 
the EU and of several ministries in order to harmonize its legislation with that of the 
EU.   
   
In the case of Abkhazia, the projects supporting the civil society had very positive 
results, where a trend towards more democratisation is seen. Moreover, as mentioned in 
the previous subsection, the Abkhazians’ attitude and discourse towards Europe became 
more positive. However, ironically, there was another unintended impact these projects 
had. Strengthening of civil society in Abkhazia gave more credibility to secessionist 
groups in Abkhazia. In South Ossetia the assistance from the EU was also limited. In 
South Ossetia, the conditionality was employed more than in the case of Abkhazia, 
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however, on the non-political matters. Nevertheless, the Commissions participation in 
the JCC on the observer base and its assistance to the OSCE has supported the peace 
process.  
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6 Discussion  
 
 
In this section we are going to discuss the determinants of the EU’s impact towards 
conflict resolution in Georgia through the instruments of conditionality and social 
learning. We will base this discussion on the following factors that are affecting the 
extent of EU’s impact: value of benefit, subjective values, or the identification of third 
parties with Europe, timing, and credibility obligations. Additionally we will discuss 
about EU’s capabilities of exercising its normative power, with main emphasis on 
economic capabilities, political and military ones.    
 
As written in the previous subsection, the EU didn’t have a significant impact on 
conflict resolution in Georgia. This can be explained from the value of benefit 
perspective. It is stressed that the EU is more effective in exercising its normative power 
and having the capacity to act abroad if they offer a membership prospects to a country. 
However as this is not in the case of Georgia it still perceived its inclusion in the ENP 
as a step towards deeper European integration. Thereby, the acceptance of EU policies 
and willingness for domestic structural change was more evident in Georgia than in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The domestic actors of Georgia are more disposed to 
changes and interaction with the EU if the benefits are higher than the costs. In this 
context ENP is seen by Georgian political elite and civil society as a valuable 
instrument with the aim of strengthening democracy, rule of law, provisions of human 
rights, and sustainable development. This would generate the possibility for Georgia to 
asses its integrity and so resolve its conflicts. In our opinion the ENP is weak and less 
precise when it comes to the issues of how the progress will be measured and judged, 
especially because there is no time requirement of when the objectives should be 
fulfilled. The benefits of the ENP are not considered as valuable by the secessionist 
entities as they were not included in the ENP as such. Furthermore, it is important to 
mention that it is rather the EU economic than political focus which is seen as an 
objective value and thus can have impact on conflict resolution.  
 
In order to have an impact in conflict resolution outside the borders there is also a need 
to a closer interaction between the EU and the third party. Especially, the EU’s caution 
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in avoiding official contact with the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia has 
hampered the effectiveness of EU in the conflict resolution. 
 
When looking at the subjective values, it relates to how conflict parties view their future 
orientation of belonging. In the case of Georgia, the leaders have proclaimed their 
attachment to Europe in term of history, geography and culture. The Abkhazia and the 
South Ossetia do not recognise EU’s role in conflict resolution, because they perceive 
EU as being on the side of Georgia. This is also explained by the EU’s attitude towards 
secessionist entities, which are not recognised as independent and international actors 
and thus excluded from any kinds of negotiations. The secessionist entities exclusion 
from discussions and negotiations over the ENP, provided for no awareness of the EU 
policy and its potential benefits. According to Tocci, the EU’s role is perceived by 
secessionist entities as “a long-term and structural rather than short term and 
geopolitical” (2007: 144). According to Abkhazians and Ossetians the real actors in the 
region are Russia and USA, and thus EU with its normative power as playing a 
secondary role.  
 
When taking the time factor into considerations we can say that the EU main policy 
ENP is aimed to deliver the benefits in long term. The long term benefits are less visible 
in a short time and thus long term benefits are valued less than short term ones. Inability 
of the EU to provide instruments in short term diminishes the credibility of the EU in 
the eyes of Abkhazian and South Ossetian as well as in Georgian population.  
 
It is important to emphasize that EU’s effectiveness in conflict resolution in Georgia 
was also determined by the credibility of the EU’s obligations by the third parties. 
Credibility in this context depended on how Georgian, Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
perceived the EU’s capacity and willingness to act in conflict resolution and to fulfil its 
commitments.  
 
The credibility of the EU in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is limited as the EU’s 
contractual relationship with Georgia is seen by the secessionist entities with suspicion 
and mistrust. The EU’s credibility as an important player is also diminished by the fact 
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that the EU is not participating as a formal player on the negotiation table concerning 
conflict settlement in Georgia. It seems though that the EU achieved its credibility in the 
region when it provided financial assistance however its credibility was questioned 
when EU engaged politically.   
 
The inability of the EU to participate more effectively in the conflict resolution in 
Georgia can also be explained from the capability perspective. As it is mentioned above, 
the financial assistance of the EU towards Georgia has been of a great assistance to the 
economic development of the country and strengthening of rehabilitation processes in 
the conflict zones. However, the magnitude of these aids provided to Georgia was 
relatively insignificant, in relation to the EU aids delivered to other countries with 
regional conflicts. For example, the financial assistance provided to Palestine was 
almost 10 times higher than the one given to Georgia (Tocci, 2007). It is argued that if 
the EU’s economic assistance was higher in magnitude, then perhaps the EU could have 
made some bigger changes in the country, especially regarding the fact that the EU is 
one of the biggest economic powers in the world.   
 
Moreover, we have said that the EU’s political involvement in the conflict was limited. 
In our opinion, this is because the internal structure and decision-making procedure of 
the EU. In a Union, with 27 member states (and 25 at the time of negotiating the border 
control mission), it is difficult to reach a consensus on the matters of conflict resolution, 
especially when the decisions are taken by the unanimity in these issues. More than that, 
the collapse of the Constitutional treaty had a damaging effect on the image of the EU 
as a reliable and serious actor in Georgia on one hand and on the other this has 
diminished the political capability of the EU in relation to the third countries.  
 
Furthermore, the failing of the EU to establish contact with the leadership of the South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia has affected the EU’s effectiveness in the conflict resolution. 
There were no political negotiations from the side of the EU with the secessionist 
entities.  
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Besides, the political inability of the EU in facilitating conflict resolution was due to 
multiplicity of other international actors involved in the conflict resolution. The 
presence of many international actors in the country has shadowed the presence of the 
EU. Thus, in order to be more effective, the EU must increase its visibility on the 
political area in the conflict zone. Moreover, “Compared with other actors, the EU can 
offer added value, with its image as an “honest broker” free from traditional US/Russia 
rivalries; access to a range of soft and hard-power tools; and the lure of greater 
integration into Europe” (International Crisis Group Report no 173, 2006: 1). In 
addition to that, the active participation of Russia in Georgia has weakened the stand of 
the EU in this conflict resolution. As mentioned above, the EU had difficulties actively 
involving itself in the conflict resolution, because they did not wish to antagonize 
Russia and spoil its relationship with Russia.  
 
In terms of military capacity, the EU has shown its capacity to act militarily, for 
instance, the ARTHEMIS operation in Congo. However, the EU, as mentioned 
throughout the project, did not contribute to the conflict resolution through its military. 
In the case of the Georgian conflict, we think that the EU could have acted more 
actively using military instruments, especially in the border control and the 
peacekeeping. The lack of participation of the EU in border monitoring in Georgia can 
be explained by the EU internal dynamics, where it was difficult to reach a consensus. 
“The lack of political consensus was in large part caused by the hesitancy of some 
member states – particularly France, Greece and Italy – to take steps which Russia 
might consider antagonistic. … The 2005 failure to establish a full-fledged ESDP 
mission on the Georgian-Russian border suggests it will be difficult to obtain member 
state-agreement on military or police-related activities that could be construed 
negatively by Russia.” (International Crisis Group Report no 173, 2006: 24-25). Thus 
due to inability of the EU to act in a single voice regarding the conflict in Georgia, has 
affected its effectiveness in the conflict resolution. 
 
As mentioned above, the EU has and is acting normatively in Georgia. Although as a 
normative power it could have employed the military resources, the EU has preferred 
the more soft instruments. Although we do agree that the use of force is not a solution 
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of a problem, we have to also mention that the soft instruments not always can have 
desirable consequences in the conflicts. The EU could have achieved more in the 
conflict resolution by using its military resources in the country’s peacekeeping and 
border control. It is difficult to be effective if exploiting only economic or political or 
other soft means. In order to provide political solutions to conflicts, these means must 
be combined.  
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7 Conclusion  
 
The main goal of this research was to investigate the impact of the EU’s normative 
power in conflict resolution in Georgia. In order to analyse whether the EU acts in 
normative way in conflict resolution in Georgia, we took Ian Manners theoretical 
approach of Normative Power Europe. We used his approach to detect whether the EU 
has acted in a normative way towards Georgia. Based on our empirical finding we have 
seen that the EU has in fact acted normatively in Georgia. This so, because the EU has 
and is delivering humanitarian, economic and technical assistance to the country and 
through its neighbourhood instrument of ENP.  
 
The EU, through its policies towards Georgia, has intended to spread the universal 
values and strengthen democracy, rule of law, human rights in Georgia. Including these 
principles in its instrument of foreign policy as ENP, it has established the discourse 
towards the third party and has tried to realize them in practice. Moreover, it’s not only 
through the ENP that the EU has tried to diffuse these universal norms and values, but 
also other projects and programs were aimed at that. Furthermore, the ENP clearly 
states that the EU has not a wish to impose its norms and values, but it stresses that 
these norms are universal norms, which are common to the EU and Georgia, as Georgia 
is a signatory to numerous international treaties and conventions.   
 
In order to answer our research question concerning how the EU exercised its normative 
power through the mechanisms of Europeanization, we applied the two main 
mechanisms used by the EU towards conflict resolution in Georgia as conditionality and 
social learning. The EU has built its policies of conditionality towards Georgia with the 
aim of transforming the governing structures, the economy and the civil society and by 
this aiming to affect the conflict resolution. The social learning mechanism occurred 
mainly through interactions of the official leaders and civil society organization with the 
EU’s institutions. Conditionality and social learning in the case of Georgia occurred 
simultaneously. The process of Europeanization in the periphery of the EU has another 
dynamic than the process of Europeanization inside the EU. First of all, the Georgia and 
secessionists entities do not have the means to codetermine the EU decisions and 
instruments that affect them. This had implications for the effectiveness of the EU 
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policies and instruments and thus the impact on domestic changes and conflict 
resolution was rather law. The incentives of the third parties to interact with the EU 
institutions are rather low. 
 
The EU’s normative power did not affect the peace process. The conditionality 
mechanism through which the EU exported its norms has rather followed than led to 
domestic change in Georgia. In spite of the fact that aid conditionality on Georgia was 
consistent, this did not lead domestic change in relation to the conflict.  
 
Institutionally, the changes occurred in the judicial and border management system. As 
referred to the changes in the domestic structures the EU policies, mainly the ENP was 
adjusting the strategic position of Georgia. The main idea was that by encouraging 
democracy, the rule of law, human rights legislation etc Georgia could become more 
attractive to secessionist entities and so the integrity of the country could be kept in this 
way. The EU had an impact on framing Georgians believes and expectations towards 
their European identity and the benefits, which contractual relations could offer. As 
concerning secessionist entities the change in their discourse towards European norms 
and values was low and was limited only to civil society leaders.     
   
The limited impact of the EU in the conflict resolution in Georgia is related to its 
capability. Although the EU has economic, political capability and militarily, it did not 
accomplish to make full use of it. Despite the fact that the financial assistance of the EU 
towards Georgia was very useful in strengthening the economic development in the 
country, its magnitude, compared to the aid provided to other conflicting countries, 
could have been bigger. The internal structure and the decision-making procedures of 
the EU had an impact on the inadequacy of its policies towards the conflict resolution in 
Georgia. The difficulties in reaching the consensus on the issue of conflict resolution in 
Georgia have constrained its policy towards the conflict resolution. This lack of 
consensus between the member states of the EU has prevented the EU to use its military 
instruments in the conflict resolution process and assist the country by providing border 
control and peacekeeping. Thus the main weakness of the EU in conflict resolution in 
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Georgia was due to its inability of the EU to act in a single voice regarding the conflict 
in Georgia. 
 
The collapse of the Constitutional Treaty had also damaging effect on the image of the 
EU in the eyes of the third countries and diminished its political capability towards the 
conflict resolution. The fear of the EU and its member states to antagonize Russia, has 
led to limited participation of the EU in the peace process in Georgia. Moreover, the 
failure of the EU to establish an official cooperation with the political leaders of the 
secessionist entities had weakened the credibility of the EU.  
 
Furthermore, the inability of the EU to increase its visibility in the conflict resolution 
due to the presence of other political actors in Georgia has weakened the stand of the 
EU in the conflict resolution in the country. The competing, rather than complementary 
nature of the relations between the international actors in Georgia diminished the 
success in peace process.  
 
The EU’s failure to combine the political, economic and, when necessary, military 
means in the conflict resolution in Georgia has affected the impact of its policies 
towards the peace process.  
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